Northern Ireland’s Language Policy（Part I）

北愛爾蘭的語言政策（第一部份）

施正鋒

淡江大學公共行政學系副教授、歐洲聯盟研究協會理事

Associate Professor, Tamkang University Department of Public Administration

Member, European Union Studies Association - Taiwan

                                                         本文原刊載於 2003年1月6日 Taiwan News

INTRO. In the present essay Professor Shih Cheng-feng relates the setbacks and advancements of the Gaelic language against the background of several centuries of political, religious and ethnic-group struggle in Ireland and Northern Ireland.  It closely examines the relationship between language policies on the one hand and allocation of resources and cultural identity at various stages in history, in hopes that it may serve as a reference for Taiwan’s implementation of a multilingual social policy. This article is the first installment of a two-part essay, the second to appear in the January 20 issue of Taiwan News.

 作者施正鋒教授整理愛爾蘭語言在數百年政治、宗教、族群抗爭中的興衰起落，詳細地分析各個時期的語言政策與資源分配、文化認同的關係，可作為國內實行多語政策的參考。本文做上、下兩部分，第二部分將於1月20日刊登。

 The utilitarian view is　that languages are merely instruments of communication.  But any given language is not only symbolic of a given language but also part and parcel of that culture and its accompanying ethno-cultural identity.

Joshua Fishman (Ó Murchú, 2000: 85-86)

 Language is the nature of human species, and it is not only an important instrument for communication but also the carrier of identity, both of the individual and of group.  Indeed, it is an instrument for cultural and spiritual development and _expression.  To constrain language is to constrain human nature.  This means to diminish humanity, instead of to elevate and celebrate it.

John Packer (2002)

本文開始

Preamble

壹、  前言

Heretofore, most people have been conditioned to assume that “language is no more than a tool for communication,” implying that there is no need to be particularly concerned about choice of language to be used / usage.  In fact, however, this is not the case.  Language ability has an effect upon channels of action relating to such matters as education, the media and governmental resources—which is to say, it is something which helps to assure access to material resources.  Additionally, language broadly serves as a foundation for transmitting group culture and conveying group identity.  Thus, choice of language to be used constitutes a basic right.  The problem here is that, either in terms of allocation of resources or ascertaining of identity, the choice of language to be used not only is determined by the degree of political power possessed, but has the reciprocal effect of reinforcing the power of those who make the choice.  Hence it is that competition between social groups is often over choice of language.

在過去，一般人被灌輸的看法是「語言只不過是一種溝通的工具」，言下之意，沒有必要去計較語言的使用。事實不然，語言能力左右著接近教育、媒體、以及政府資源等公共財的管道，也就是物質取得的保障；此外，語言往往是一個族群負載文化、表達認同的基礎，因此，語言的選擇更是一種基本的權利。問題是，不管是從資源分配、還是認同確認來看，語言的使用不僅取決於政治權力的多寡，還會回過頭來鞏固支配性語言使用者的權力，因此，族群間的競爭往往是為了語言的選擇。

        As therefore candidly and fearlessly stated by the Irishwoman Helen Ó Murchú, Chairperson of the European Less Used Languages Bureau, “Whether implicitly or explicitly, language has always been a political issue, inasmuch as language obviously involves questions of disparities in power.”  When language is employed to distinguish between “insiders” and “outsiders,” as long as some persons thereby occupy an advantageous position, there will always be those who on the other hand are thereby consigned to a disadvantageous position.  Conflict is therefore hard to avoid, and for this reason, linguistic pluralism cannot easily avoid being regarded as a root of social conflict, or at least as a tool for political struggle.

愛爾蘭籍／裔的「歐洲鮮用語言協會」前會長Helen Ó Murchú便直言不諱：「或明或暗，語言一直是政治議題，因為語言明顯地牽涉到權力差別的問題」。當語言被用來區隔為「自己人」、以及「旁人」之際，只要有人佔有優勢，就會有人居於相對劣勢，衝突自是難免，也因此，語言的多元不免被視為社會衝突的根源，或者至少是政治鬥爭的工具。

        Despite this circumstance, Mari FitzDuff, former director of Northern Ireland’s official Community Relations Council (CRC), has noted a major shift in international tide with respect to attitudes toward multilingual societies, namely the tendency of attitudes to transcend resignation to the inevitability of conflict and to develop in the direction of a basic acceptance of differences between people, with the further hope of undertaking positive cooperation between linguistic groups.  Efforts at social reconciliation in Northern Ireland during the two periods of the 1970s and the 1990s differed most importantly in that during the former period the emphasis was upon allocation of power, whereas during the latter period attention was also given to linguistic fairness and to respect for social-group identity.  Ever since Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland signed the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement in 1998, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, in addition to establishing a language-revival organization, has also actively pressed for inclusion of a “language rights article” in a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights now in draft stage. 

儘管如此，前北愛爾蘭官方「族群關係理事會」的理事長注意到當前國際潮流對於多元語言的看法有重大變動，也就是在超越宿命式的衝突觀、發展到對於差異的起碼接受，進而企盼進行正面的合作。北愛爾蘭在1970、1990年代分別進行和解，最大的差別在於前者著重權力的分配，後者則兼顧語言的公平性、以及對於族群認同的尊重。自從北愛爾蘭、英國、以及愛爾蘭三方在1998年簽署『北愛爾蘭和平協定』以來，除了設立相關的語言振復機構外，「北愛爾蘭人權委員會」更是積極地在草擬中的『人權法案』(Bill of Rights) 裡頭規劃「語言權條款」。

Language and social group structure

貳、語言與族群結構

Presently, the population of Northern Ireland is approximately 1.69 million.  The most recent census was completed in 2001, but its results have not yet been publicly announced.  According to the previous census conducted in 1991, the population stood at about 1.58 million.  In the consciousness of Northern Irelanders, their society’s social-group structure is broadly differentiated as belonging either to the Roman Catholic or Protestant religious tradition.  The fact that even atheists feel impelled to identify themselves with either the Catholic or the Protestant groupings demonstrates that religious labels are indeed representative of contrasting group identities.  Currently, the ratio between these two ethnic groups, in that order, is 45:51.

當前北愛爾蘭的人口約一百六十九萬人。最近一次的人口普查在2001年完成，不過資料尚未對外公佈；根據上一次的人口普查（1991年），人口約一百五十八萬人。根據北愛爾蘭人自己的認知，他們的族群結構大致是以天主教徒、以及新教徒作為分歧的界線；因此，即使是無神論者也要區分到底是屬於天主教徒、還是新教徒，可見宗教標籤代表的是族群認同。目前兩個族群的人口比率分別是45%：51%。

        Catholics are primarily concentrated in the western periphery of the country, while Protestants are concentrated in the urban region centered on Belfast.  Additionally, the Northern Ireland population includes a number of minority groups: 3,125~5,125 people of Chinese origin; 1,050 of Indian origin; 641 of Pakistani origin; 1,366 Travelers; and 88 of miscellaneous groups.  In reality, in Northern Ireland religious faith is closely related to national status and national identity as well as to individual economic and social status, with the two religious traditions constituting a mutually reinforcing dialectic:

Catholics = nationalists = Irish

Protestants = unionists = English

天主教徒主要分布在邊陲的西部，新教徒則以貝爾法斯特為中心的都會區。 此外，北愛爾蘭還有一些少數族群，分別是華人3,125-5,125人、印度人1,050人、巴基斯坦人641人、Traveller 1,366人、以及其他 88人。其實，宗教信仰在北愛爾蘭又與國家定位、以及國家認同、甚至於社會經濟地位高度相關，也就是相互強化的二分法：

天主教徒＝民族主義者＝愛爾蘭人

新教徒＝聯合主義者＝英國人

        Generally speaking, Catholics are of the belief that Northern Ireland’s ultimate problem is the matter of its national definition; whereas Protestants believe that religion is the primary problem, which actually rests in their own attitude of ostracism toward Catholicism. Catholics’ sense of special ethnic identity tends to be stronger than that of Protestants, which is further reflected in the two groups’ disparate views regarding Northern Ireland’s national definition.  For the most part, Catholics support merging Northern Ireland with Ireland, those taking this stance thus characterized as “Irish nationionalists.”  Protestants nearly all advocate remaining in union with Britain to form the “United Kingdom,” people of this persuasion therefore being referred to as “unionists.”  Hence, some writers are accustomed to distinguishing between the two social groups by describing them as “Nationalist Catholics” and “Unionist Protestants.”  In accordance with the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Northern Ireland parliamentarians must, after being elected, register their sense of identity-leaning as either nationalist, unionist or otherwise, in order to facilitate deciding whether voting on legal bills should be evaluated in conformance with the alternative “parallel consensus” criteria or “special majority” criteria.

大體而言，天主教徒認為北愛爾蘭的癥結在國家定位，新教徒則認為宗教才是主因，也就是他們對於天主教的排拒；天主教徒的民族認同比新教徒來得清楚，進而反映在他們對於國家定位的看法分歧。一般而言，天主教徒大多支持北愛爾蘭應該與愛爾蘭共和國統一，這種政治立場被稱為「【愛爾蘭】民族主義者」(Nationalist)，新教徒則多主張留在英國（聯合王國、即United Kingdom），因此稱為「聯合主義者」(Unionist)；因此，有些作者會用「民族主義者／天主教徒」(Nationalist Catholic)、以及「聯合主義者／新教徒」(Unionist Protestant) 分別稱呼他們。根據『北愛爾蘭和平協定』，每個北愛爾蘭議員選上後必須登錄自己的認同是民族主義者、聯合主義者、還是其他，以便計算法案的通過是否符合「同步共識」、還是「特別多數」。

        Catholics are of Irish ancestry, considering themselves is “natives.” Protestants are settlers who followed the conquering British army to Ireland, most of them being the descendants of either lowland Scots or Englishmen who began arriving in 1607.  Despite the fact that, reasonably speaking, the peoples of Ireland and Scotland have geographic ties, shared historical roots and linguistic and cultural similarities, the two ethnic groups have been antagonistic toward each other as the consequence of religious differences — Catholicism vs. Presbyterian Protestantism, engendering an irreconcilable dichotomy between to two ethnic identities which had become apparent by the mid 19^th century.  Inasmuch as the Protestants are all native-born Northern Irelanders, it is no longer so easy to treat them as “outsiders.”  As a matter of fact, up until 1920, Protestants regarded themselves as “both Irish and British” while, on the other hand, Catholics sense of national identity was “We’re Irish, not British.”  However, following, the 1921 partition of Ireland into (southern) Ireland and Northern Ireland, Protestants began to feel relatively unwilling to recognize themselves as Irish, at most thinking of themselves as “Northern Irelanders.”  Following World War II, their identities as “Brits” became less strongly affirmed by those living in Britain, thus leaving them feeling looked down upon both in Northern Ireland and Great Britain.  Hence, rather than saying that “Protestantism” in Northern Ireland names a religious faith, it would be more accurate to say that it names a secular social-group identity and/or political identity.

天主教徒是愛爾蘭人的後裔，自認為是本地人 (natives)，新教徒則是隨著英國征服愛爾蘭而來的墾殖者 (settlers)，大多是從1607年就陸續前來的低地蘇格蘭人、或是英格蘭人的後裔；照說，愛爾蘭人與蘇格蘭人有地緣關係、歷史淵源、語言文化相近，卻因宗教差異而被以夷制夷（天主教徒vs. 長老會新教徒），終於造成民族認同也南轅北轍，到十九世紀中，兩個族群已經涇渭分明。既然新教徒都是在北愛爾蘭土生土長，已經很難將他們視為外來者。事實上，一直到1920年為止，新教徒還會自認為「既是愛爾蘭人、也是英國人」，相對地，天主教徒的民族認同則是「是愛爾蘭人、不是英國人」。不過，南北愛爾蘭在1921年分手，新教徒就開始比較不願意承認自己是愛爾蘭人，頂多是「北愛爾蘭人」；戰後，他們的「英國人」身分也不太得到英國本土的迴響，兩面不是人，因此，與其說「新教徒」是宗教信仰，不如說是世俗的族群認同、或是政治認同。

        The primary reason that religious affiliation has become a label for distinguishing between social groups in Northern Ireland is that after Ireland had been conquered by the British, its entire society fell into disarray and its nobility and educated elite were ruined and dispersed; and the Catholic Church was the only thing left that could keep the original sense of community from expiring and serve as a cohesive, vital force, particularly through its operation of parochial schools.  The reader should be reminder here, however, that Northern Ireland’s inter-group conflict is not a conflict generated by any difference in religious ideology.  Rather, it is one caused by long-term control of the Northern Ireland government by Protestants (1921~1972) and by the resultant multifaceted discrimination Catholics encountered in political activity, education and employment, which aggravated original disagreements over national definition and national identity.

宗教信仰之所以會成為北愛爾蘭的族群辨識標記，主要是因為愛爾蘭人在被英國人征服後，整個社會崩解、貴族精英潰散，只剩下天主教會還能苟延殘喘，扮演維繫命脈的角色，特別是開辦教會學校。不過，我們必須提醒讀者，北愛爾蘭的族群衝突並不是因為教義差異而導致的宗教衝突，而是北愛爾蘭政府長期由新教徒所控制 (1921-1972)，對於天主教徒在政治參與、教育、以及就業上百般歧視，因而強化了原本彼此在國家定位、以及國家認同的歧異。

From 1541, when the House of Tudor’s King Henry VIII visited Ireland, up until the mid nineteenth century, the Irish language, or Gaelic, was regarded as the language employed by native Irish rebels, and Britain did all in its power to suppress and ban use of that language. Thus, by 1713, nearly all the Irish had assimilated into the English-speaking tradition, leaving only illiterate countryside folk who could still speak the “local language.”  In 1831, Britain began to set up so-called “national schools” in Ireland employing only English for teaching, not permitting the use of Gaelic.  If students were caught using         Gaelic to speak with each other, they would be made fun of, insulted and punished — a condition which persisted into the early 20^th century.

從都德王朝的亨利八世君臨愛爾蘭 (1541) 到十九世紀為止，愛爾蘭語被當作是當地叛亂份子的所使用的語言，英國費盡心思加以打壓、查禁。一直到1713年為止，愛爾蘭人大致被通盤同化，只剩不識字的鄉下人還會說「方言」。英國於1831年在愛爾蘭設立所謂的「國民學校」，使用英文教學；學校不教愛爾蘭語，學生如果用愛爾蘭語交談，會被老師嘲笑、羞辱、處罰，一直延續到二十世紀初期為止。

        In the second half of the 19^th century, however, Catholics under the influence of the Enlightenment movement and the romantic nationalism of Germain came to believe that cultural differences constituted a strong tool for pushing forward an independence movement.  Consequently they launched a movement of linguistic self-defense.  From the point of view of the politics-controlling Protestants, on the other hand, “Gaelic” was tantamount to an equivalent of Catholicism or Irish nationalism.  Striking fear in their hearts, the Gaelic language movement was even more forcefully suppressed, creating a further polarization between Catholics and Protestants.

不過，在十九世紀下半葉，天主教受到西歐的啟蒙運動、以及日爾曼的浪漫式民族主義影響，相信文化差異是獨立運動的利器，因而開始著手語言的自我保護；然而，對於支配政治的新教徒來說，愛爾蘭語幾乎就是天主教、或是愛爾蘭民族主義的同義字，心生恐懼而加緊壓制，造成兩極化。

        According to the 1991 Northern Ireland census, there remained only 131,974 people, or about 8.8% of the population who could speak Gaelic, particularly on the southern and western regions of the country.  The greatest urban concentration of Gaelic speakers, however, was in Belfast, where 27,430 were found.  In second place with metropolitan Derry, with 9,731 people.  In a few Local Government Districts (LGD), Gaelic speaks numbered 30% of the population, and even as high is more than 50%.  Further assessing the personal profiles of Gaelic speakers, 89.4% of them are Catholic, demonstrating the intimate relatedness of language, group identity and religious affiliation.  That is to say, although Catholics may not be able to speak Gaelic, those who can speak English are quite likely Catholics.  In this connection, Catholics very widely support Gaelic-English bilingualism in the public sector, with 72.5% of them, for example, advocating its use in most public settings and 60% advocating bilingualism in the workplace.  By contrast, Protestant support for bilingualism in these to realms is, respectively, 30.0% and 13.3%.  As for bilingualism in private realms, Catholics approve of it by an overwhelming 90%, whereas only 63.3% of Protestants approve.

根據1991年的人口普查，目前北愛爾蘭會說愛爾蘭語的人數只有131,974，約8.8%，特別是在南區、以及西區，不過，人數最多的還是在貝爾法斯特，有27,430人，其次是在第二大都會區Derry，有9,731人；在一些「地方政府區域」，會講愛爾蘭語的人超過30%、甚至於一半以上。進一步考察會說愛爾蘭語的個人特色，89.4%是天主教徒，可見語言與族群認同／宗教信仰的相關；也就是說，雖然天主教徒不一定會講愛爾蘭語，不過，會講愛爾蘭語的人有很大的可能是天主教徒。此外，天主教徒普遍對於公領域的雙語（愛爾蘭語／英語）相當支持，譬如一般場所72.5%、上班地方60.0%，而新教徒的支持率分別是30.0%、13.3%；至於私領域的雙語，天主教徒贊成的高達90.0%，新教徒只有63.3%。

        Of interest is the fact that of those who are able to speak Gaelic, those 44 years of age or younger account for 78.1% , those 45 or older accounting for 21.8%; and that 59.9% can both speak and write Gaelic, while 34.4% can only speak it.  These data indicate that Gaelic-revival education has experienced considerable success.  Further analyzing the economic backgrounds of Gaelic speakers, 31.8% are engaged either in managerial or technology-related companies, and 33.8% work as non-manual-labor technicians — no longer necessarily being low-income people or illiterate people in the countryside.

值得注意的是在這些會講愛爾蘭語的人當中，44歲以下的人佔了78.1%，45歲以上的人只佔了21.8%，會說寫的有59.9%，只會說的佔34.4，可見愛爾蘭語的復育有相當的成就。細究那些會講愛爾蘭語者的社會經濟背景，31.8%從事管理、或是科技的職業，33.8%擔任非手工的技術人員，不一定是低所得、或是不識字的鄉下人。

        As Chriost reminds us, however, the relationships between the ability to speak Gaelic or support for use of Gaelic on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the questions of national definition, national identity and even political conflict, by no means appear, superficially, to be direct relationships.  Which is to say, the “Catholic-group/Irish nationalist” sense of identity of non-Gaelic-speakers is no less strong than that of Gaelic speakers.  Moreover, 23% of Protestants believe that all middle schools should offer Gaelic-language, and Irish-culture curricula.  And, of course, there are some nationalists who believe that promotion of Gaelic can bridge the gap between Catholics and Protestants — meaning that although learning Gaelic may not cause Protestants to change their religious affiliation, it nevertheless can succeed in changing their senses of national identity. Despite this view, it could be that the intent of Protestants willing to learn Gaelic is merely to employ language and culture as an avenue for assertion of their own self-definitions on that piece of land—that is as an _expression of a distinctive “Northern Irelander” identity, and not a an affirmation of support for Irish nationalism.

不過，Chriost提醒我們，會不會說愛爾蘭語、或是支持愛爾蘭語，與國家定位／民族認同、甚至於政治衝突的關係，並沒有表面上看來直接，也就是說，不會說愛爾蘭語者的「天主教族群／愛爾蘭民族認同」就一定比那些會講愛爾蘭語者來得低；事實上，有23%的新教徒認為中學應該有愛爾蘭語言、文化的課程。當然有些民族主義者相信愛爾蘭語可以跨越族群間的鴻溝，也就是即使無法使新教徒改變宗教信仰，卻可以改變他們的國家認同。儘管如此，那些願意學習愛爾蘭語的新教徒，可能只是想想透過語言／文化，來確認自己在愛爾蘭這塊土地的定位，也就是「北愛爾蘭人」的認同，而非表示支持愛爾蘭民族主義。

Edited by Tina Lee/Translated by James Decker/ Organized by EUSA-Taiwan

編輯 李美儀/ 英文翻譯曹篤明/ 策劃 歐洲聯盟研究協會

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