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National
Identity and National Security:The Case of Taiwan* |
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Cheng-Fong, SHIH Department
of Public Administration, Tamkang University,
TAIWAN |
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Introduction
For more than half a century, national security policy has been largely
understood as national defense policy, given Chinese irredentist claim over
Taiwan’s sovereignty. In the past
decade, while Taiwan has mainly liberated itself from the party-state rule
under the Kuomintang (literally Chinese Nationalist Party), it has yet to
consolidate its new gained democracy.
Three crucial tasks have to be undertaken: forging national identity,
integrating ethnic cleavages, and reconstructing political institutions. Among the three, dubious national
identity, that is, being Taiwanese or Chinese, would complicate how Taiwan
may perceive its national security and make its security policy.[1][1]
In the past, it had been expected that while political rivalries in
the home front may have made the choice of security strategy intractable,
external threats from China, military and vocal, on the other hand, would
actually compel all political forces in Taiwan to mend their differences and
to converge their national identity. Given the 1995-96 missile crises, this
line of argument seemed to have prevailed. However, latest Chinese economic
maneuvers targeted at Taiwanese businessmen (台商) impel us to consider possible
other sources of threat to security.
In this study, we will start with the development of a conceptual framework
for national security, where national identity will have recursive impacts:
while one’s national identity will decide one’s perception of national
security, one’s comprehension of security and threat would prompt one to
reconcile one’s own national identity.
Secondly, we will endeavor to clarify the unnecessary equivalence of
“national identity” with “state identity,” which in turn has made political
Taiwanese [state] identity unfortunately entangled with cultural Chinese
[national] identity. Thirdly, we
will how the causal link between national identity and to national security
is intermediated by some other factors in the case of Taiwan. Conceptual
Frameworks for National Security
The development of National Security studies has generally followed that of
International Relations theory, that is, the three “great debates”: idealism
vs. realism, realism vs. behaviorism, and positivism vs. post-positivism
(Smith, 1995: 14-15). McSweeny (1999) thus arrive at four phases of Security
Studies: political theory, political science, political economy, and
sociology, with respective focus on common security, strategy,
international/comprehensive security, and human security. The last phase, starting with the
early 1990s, would focus how perception would have impacts on security, and
accordingly emphasize the importance of identity and security construction.
In retrospection, we can generalize that the concept of security has
developed along two dimensions: sources of threat, and subjects of
security/targets of threat. While
the former would enlarge from politics, military, economy, environment, and
to society, the latter would deepen from national, international, and to
human. Alternatively, we may have
a third dimension of security, that is, whether it is characters or
relationships. In this fashion,
security may contain both objective physical configurations and subjective
mental conditions; while the former denotes being free from physical threats,
the latter stands for feeling secure (Snow, 1998).
McSweeney (1999: 14-15) similarly classifies the
concept of security into positive and negative ones. Traditional notions of security tend
to take a negative form, that is, avoiding physical
threats. In this sense, security
is something tangible, observable, and measurable. By so conceptualized, the concern of
security is how to mobilize physical resources in order to counter external
threats, guarantee territorial integrity, and preserve domestic
institutions. In other words,
national security, at least in the short run, is tantamount to military
defense. On the other hand,
positive security is conceived as relationship, which is a human construction
as reflected in stable or changing collective identity. McSweeney
(1999: 17) terms it as “ontological security,” and further breaks it down
into self, social capabilities, and confidence to deal with others. In this broad definition, insecurity
is threat to values or identity (Tickner, 1995:
180). Accordingly, a long-term
contemplation of national security has to take national identity into
account.
According to the state-centric conception in realism, the subject of security
is the state. Therefore, the
supreme goal of security is to guarantee national security against external
threats. Since the international
system is deemed as a status of anarchy, in order to uphold
self-preservation, the state has to rely on military forces (Waltz, 1979). Under such a framework, a state’s
capacity of security is measured by its military capabilities relative to its
opponents (Figure 1).
Based on the tenets if neo-liberalism, Jepperson,
Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996) argue that whether an
event is considered as threat is contingent upon the definition of national
interests, which in turn would decide what constitutes proper security policy
is and what adequate actions to take.
Therefore, while the above framework may be succinct, its fails to take
societal factors into account, especially those national identity and
norms/culture[2][1] environments that may influence a
state’s survival, behavior, and characters (Jepperson
et al., 1996: 35-36). Taking a
constructivist approach, they take note not only that national identity would
have impacts on norms/culture, bust also that
culture would determine the formation of national identity (pp. 52-53). We thus have a revised framework of
security (Figure 2).
While agree with Jepperson et al. that national
security is decided by collective identity, particularly when members of the
state fail to agree upon the contents of national identity, Wendt (1994) and
Campbell (1998), taking a similar perception approach, would underline the
importance of identity, rather than norms or culture. According to the interpretation of Ktazenstein (1996: 19-22), norms and culture are at best
interpreted as contexts of security policy. Therefore, the independent variable
for security that Jepperson et al. (1996) have
introduced is identity. We thus
have the revised Figure 3.
Figure 3： Revised Perception View of Security
Challenging the conception of security by the once dominant realism, McSweeny (1999: 214) arguer that even though states, as agents,
may be not in a position to change the fundamental structure of the
international system, they at least possess the opportunity to decide whether
to accept or to reject it.
Still, he considers it that both Wendt (1994) and Campell
(1998) overstate the explanatory utility of perception, be it in the form of
identity or cultural factors, and thus proposed that national interests need
to be taken into account (p. 135).
On the other had, while admitting that
neo-functionalism may have recognized how interests would affect how we
choose our identity, he deems interests nothing but opportunity rather than
“seductive enmeshment” (McSwweny, 1999: 167-72,
195). In a nutshell, even though
both perception and neo-functional approaches attempt to surpass realism,
they overstate the explanatory utility of identity and interests
respectively; in other words, identity and interests are mutually
constructing each other, and thus in turn decide how security is perceived
(pp. 123, 214). We hence depict McSweeny’s revised view of security in Figure 4.
While generally agreeing with McSweeny (1999: 398)
that identity is the base for interests and security, we have reservations
regarding how interests may have recursively affect the choice of identity.[3][1]
After all, the interest mechanism that the European Union has exerted
on Ireland to accept peace agreement in Northern Ireland may not be
universally valid. In our view,
interests are at best an intermediary variable that may exacerbate or
mitigate the causal link between identity and security, rather than an
independent variable (Figure 5).
Culturally
National Identity and Politically State Identity
In English usage, as “national security” is equivalent to “state’s security,”
so is “national identity” to “state’s identity.” Nonetheless, there is no such an
isomorphism in Chinese (中文)/Hanji[4][1] (漢字). As a result, in the context of Taiwan,
“national identity” may be translated into both “nation’s
identity“ (min-chu-zen-ton, 民族認同) and “state’s identity“ (guo-chia-zen-tong,
國家認同), or
“identifying with the nation” and “identifying with the state”
respectively. While nation and
state are highly correlated, the two concepts obviously have different
connotations.
For two reasons,[5][2] substantive and semantic, the concept
of national identity in Taiwan tends to be understood as “state’s identity”
detached from “nation’s identity.”
For one thing, ordinary people are distasteful of the idea of nation
as it is reminiscent of the imposed official Chinese nationalism derived from
Sun Yat-sun’s Three
Principles of People (Sun-min-chu-i, 三民主義) in their days of high school under the KMT authoritarian
rule. Secondly, the elites
tend to interpret nationalism in its illiberal, chauvinistic, and expansionist
formats. As a result, concerned
scholars, contemplating to evade its pejorative denotations, have chose to use state in place of nation; and hence guo-chia-chu-i (國家主義, literally statism), instead of min-chu-chu-i (民族主義,
nationalism). Nevertheless, this
seemingly ingenious evasion becomes redundant when nation-state/nation’s state (民族[的]國家, min-chu-guo-chia)
has to be similarly translated into state-state/state’s
state (國家[的]國家, guo-chia-guo-chia).
At this juncture, national/citizen has to come to the rescue; and
hence guo-min-guo-chia
(國民國家,
nationals’ state)/gon-min-guo-chia (公民國家, citizens’ state). In
order to avoid this conceptual cloud, Ng (1998) transliterates nationalism as
na-hsiong-na-li-si-bun (那想那利斯文). Therefore, a political sense of
national identity would be preferably known as state identity, statist
identity, or identity of state.
Nonetheless, a cultural sense of “nation’s identity“ is
here to stay. People in Taiwan
tend to embrace a primordial conception of nation based on common ascribed
cultural traits,[6][3] which is essential and deterministic
and allows no room for subjective construction in Anderson’s (1991) sense of
collective imagination after common history, experience, or memory. As nation is narrowly understood as
the Han people (Han-min-chu/Han-zen, 漢民族/漢人), national identity would be confined to “naturally”
identifying with the Han people.
Since most people in Taiwan would accept the official doctrine that
they belong to the so-called “Chinese nation” (Chong-hua-min-chu, 中華民族), it is not surprising to discover that they tend to call
themselves中國人 (Chong-guo-zen,
ethnic Chinese), or more recently華人 (Hua-zen,
cultural Chinese). As a result,
while the Han people in China are included as compatriots (tong-bau, 同胞), the Aboriginal Peoples (Yuan-chu-min-chu, 原住民族) in Taiwan, culturally Austronesian and racially
Malayo-Polynesian, are excluded.
By so doing, national identity here is not only culturally determined
but also racially defined.
However, not only ethnic Chinese bust also Han people are a cultural
conglomerate constructed out of various racial stocks. By imaging themselves as “authentic”
Chinese, the Taiwanese are pursuing an oxymoron “pure hybridity.”
According to the tenets of realism, national identity is destined and
fixed. Alternatively, proponents
of constructivism would argue that national identity is formed after
interactions, negotiations, learning, definitions, and construction, which is
beyond the elites’ control (Katzenstein, 1996;
Wendt, 1992). Internally,
national identity in Taiwan has been intertwined with ethnic identity and
party identification (Shih, 2002).
As ethnic groups fail to reach consensus over formula for
resource-distribution and political parties quarrel among themselves over
rules of game for power-sharing, national identity (read state identity) is
apt to be mobilized as pawn of political competition. Ambiguous national identity has so far
developed along ethnic/party cleavages.
While the Mainlanders/Pan-blue supporters[7][4]
would consider themselves Chinese and Taiwanese as well (是中國人, 也是台灣人), in
any, the Natives/Pan-green supporter would deem themselves Taiwanese first
and Chinese second (是台灣人, 也是中國人). Of course,
there are also quite a few who consider themselves as Taiwanese only (是台灣人, 不是中國人), and
few who take themselves as Chinese only (是中國人, 不是台灣人).
It is noted that both of the terms “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” are not only
vague but ambiguous also. In
everyday life, Chinese may connote racial Han people, cultural Hua-zen, or political Chong-guo-zen.
Even though it is generally recognized that political Chinese means
nationals/citizens of the People’s Republic of China, the government of
Taiwan, under the official state name of the “Republic of China,” would
indoctrinate the Taiwanese to deem themselves as Chong-guo-zen without offering any confirming definition.[8][5]
It is no wonder that the passport of Taiwan only prints “Republic of
China” on its cover. While the
term Taiwanese has long been intentionally relegated as a regional one, it is
traditionally reserved for the Holos, the largest
ethnic group, or, more inclusively, the Natives (excluding the Mainlanders).[9][6]
Only recently have some Mainlanders begun to call themselves
Taiwanese, especially after they uncomfortably discovered that they had been
treated as “Taiwanese compatriots” (Tai-bau/Tai-wan-tong-bau, 台胞/台灣同胞) by the Chinese.
In ambivalence, they seem determined to retain the identity of
“Chinese from Taiwan” as the government appears satisfied with the
quasi-official state name “Republic of China on Taiwan.”
What has complicated the entanglement is the tendency that one’s ethnic
identity (Natives or Mainlanders) would largely decide one’s national
identity (Taiwanese or Chinese) and hence one’s attitudes toward the issue of
Taiwan’s future (Independence or Unification). Recursively, one’s ethnic identity is
also composed of one’s conception of national identity and/or Taiwan’s relations
with China in the future, especially for the Mainlanders (Shih, 2001). These mutually reinforced cleavages
are also conducive to disparate party identification.
In balance, the Taiwanese, by they
Natives or Mainlanders, have been engulfed in the intersection of a
culturally and racially defined Chinese national identity and a politically
defined Taiwanese state identity.
Externally, these dubiously interwoven national identities have led to
disparate attitudes toward China, the only enemy of Taiwan in the world
nowadays. National
Identity and National Security
Leaving aside external threats from
China, Taiwan has yet to face internal security threats resulting from
uncertain national identity.
Without reaching a certain minimal degree of national integration,
members of the state would ask: Whose security to stand guard over? Whose state to protect? What country to identify with? In other words, before we can decide
what national security is, we need to settle what our national identity is (McSweeny, 1999: 71-72; Tickner,
1991: 179-81). Those who agitate
for Taiwan’s unification with China would not protest China’s incorporation
of Taiwan.
On the spectrum of political arrangements with China, more and more Taiwanese
would welcome a de jure independent Republic of Taiwan free from
China’s labyrinth if China promises to hand off Taiwan. Close to this position is former
President Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) “Two
States Discourse” (兩國論) which claims that “cross-strait relations as a
state-to-state relationship or at least a special [sui generis]
state-to-state relationship.” Next to this posture is
President Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁)
purposefully vague “New Center Line” (新中間路線). At one occasion when speaking to a
pro-independence audience through satellite transmission, the seemingly
undaunted president proclaimed that there is “One State on Each Side” of the
Strait of Taiwan (一邊一國論), probably to protect the base of his most staunch
supporters. However, at another
point, in order to appease China, he went so far as to pledged to embark on
economic and cultural integrations with China, and to seek for a framework
for perpetual peace and eventual political integration across the Strait of
Taiwan; and hence the so-called “Integration Discourse” (統合論). It would be fair to state that what
Chen has in mind is a kind of Chinese Commonweal made up of two “Two Chinese
States” (兩個華人國家), opting for institutionalized separation.
On the other end of the continuum, only those few true believers of Chinese
irredentism would embrace outright union with China, whether under “One
State-Two System formula (一國兩制, or Hong Kong model) or unitary system. Even though federation (聯邦),
confederative federation (邦聯式聯邦), and federal confederation (聯邦式邦聯) have been
proposed by pro-China politicians and scholars, the nearest stand is “Two
States in One Chinese Nation/Cultural China” (一個民族兩個國家/文化中國, or 一族兩國)
espoused by some Chinese loyalists in the KMT. What they envision is eventual
unification between Taiwan and China, generally known as “Germany Model” (德國模式). However, sensible policy strategists
in the KMT would only venture out the idée of a confederation (邦聯)
composed of the PRC and the ROC.
Finally, James Soong (宋楚瑜) of the PFP, imitating the experience of the European Union,
has so far cautiously proposed a “Roof Discourse” (屋頂論)
. While literally preaching an
image of two families under one roof, it is not clear whether he suggest an
eventual federation, confederation, or simply commonwealth. What they share is a desire to
design certain modus operandi in order to obtain eventual association
of China and Taiwan in whatever formulas.
If military threat is too provocative and national appeal is too latent to
provide Chinese any immediate satisfaction in the direction toward political
association between China and Taiwan, meanwhile, a more discursive and yet
effective approach has been launched lunched on Taiwanese businessmen in
China, that is, “Bullying Officials with Civilians” (以民逼官),
“Pressing Politicians with Businessmen” (以商逼政), and “Promoting
Unification with Three Links[10][1]” (以通促統). On this economic front, Idealism/Neo-Liberalism has its say on
policy recommendations. A related
preference is “Westward Policy [to China]” (大膽西進) in the spirit
of functionalism, understood as a ramification of the Idealism/Liberalism
camp. Inspired by the development
of integration in West Europe, its proponents have preached that trade and
economic cooperation with China may eventually be conducive to the ease of
political rivalry and military conflict between Taiwan and its Chinese
adversary. Nonetheless, the
cleavages between the two are not confined to territorial disputes only. Underneath Chinese hostility toward
Taiwan is its violent opposition toward Taiwan’s legitimate existence in the
international society, which is not going to pass into oblivion because of
economic exchanges. In addition,
as there exist enormous socio-economic disparities
and disproportion in territorial size between Taiwan and China, disparate
from those between France and Germany, any vulgar analogy is bound to shut
one’s eyes to the issue of vulnerability resulting from Taiwan’s economic
dependency on China. Diametrically different are the prescriptions offered by
Realists/Neo-Realists. Wary of
economic security on Taiwan’s part, former President
Lee Ten-hui (李登輝) espouses a Neo-mercantilist
economic policy toward China, “Restraining Hasty Investment [in China]” (戒急用忍). Given the fact that China the only
country is the world that has openly waged military threat against Taiwan,
Lee’s purposeful selection of trade restraints is understandable. Nevertheless, the current ruling
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which came to power in May 2001, has
adjusted Taiwan’s thus far protective economic
stance toward China from “Moving Westwards [to China] While Strengthening the
[economic] Base [in Taiwan]” (強本西進) to “Actively Liberalizing [economic interactions with China]”
(積極開放) in
the name of adjustments to globalization, probably under the ceaseless
pressure from Taiwanese businessmen who expect to gain from direct links with
China.[11][2]
Some, apprehended by the conception of Neo-functionalism, have gone so
far as to aspire the eventual goal of political
unification with China as a result of deepened economic integration. Conclusions
So far, China has waged threats to Taiwan’s national
security in three dimensions: while deploying offensive missiles across the
strait of Taiwan at an alarming rate to coerce Taiwan into accepting its “One
China Precondition” (一個中國原則) after the Hong Kong Model, it has painstakingly enlisted
national sentiments to court those Taiwanese who share some racial-cultural
ethnic Chinese identity, and, at the same time, untiringly attracted
Taiwanese businessmen to move their plants to China with cheaper labor and
land.
Anxious to enter into a peace with China, President Chen appears confident to
deepen Taiwan’s economic interdependence, if not dependence, with China. In his optimistic calculation,
economic integration seems to promise pacifism as the case of European Union
has testified to the amicable relations between Germany and France. Self-styled as “Taiwan’s Nixon,” he
anticipates that his native-son identity would make his immune from the
accusation of Taiwanese traitor (台奸, Dai-gan). Having this essential conception of
national identity in mind, it is not surprised that he should ridicule the
KMT candidate of Taipei mayoral election Ma Ying-jeou
(馬英九)
contaminated with “Honk Kong Feet” (香港腳, athletic feet), implying this Hong
Kong born Mainlander is expecting to become governor of Taiwan under China’s rule (特首). By capitalizing
the coterminous relationship between ethnic identity and national identity,
he was unmistakably playing ethnic mobilization clothed in rhetoric of
national identity. By alienating
the Mainlanders, international or not, the DPP government is jeopardizing Taiwan’s
societal security.
Recalling that how a I-lan (宜蘭) born
military defector Lin Yi-fu (林義夫), who
had received a Ph.D. from University of Chicago and is now teaching at
Beijing University, had almost been acclaimed as a successful native
Taiwanese residing China before the Ministry of National Defense pledged to
charge him with high treason, we have witnessed how regional attachment is
still playing a major part in identity-formation among the Taiwanese. As the armed forces are
grumbling over for whom to fight, Taiwan cannot secure its military security
without reconciling its national identity.
Last year, the DPP government finally lifted its ban on investment in China’s
semiconductor industry by Taiwanese companies. While it is true that two of the
largest semiconductor companied which have energetically lobbied for
legalizing the already-made investment are run by Mainlanders, we must not
neglect the fact that two of the most enthusiastic promoters of direct links
with China are owned by native Taiwanese, who, somewhat naively, believe that
economy can be separated from politics and that security is the
responsibility of the government.
It may be exaggeration to state that these businessmen have not
motherland. In the age of
globalization, the phenomenon of diaspora has unleashed unlimited imagination
of national identity.
Nonetheless, it would be unfair to charge the former as traitors while
forgiving the latter’s banal ignorance.
In time, economic interests have to be attuned with national security
as defined by national identity.
In the end, a quick test of Taiwanese identity is whether how the Taiwanese
deem China, to borrow the words of Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮),
enemy, fried, or motherland, which in turn will determine how national
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