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State Power and Globalization: Adjustments of Taiwan’s Agricultural
Policy under the WTO* |
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Cheng-Feng Shih and Pei-Ing Wu** |
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Introduction Under the dominant explanatory epistemology, two rationalistic approaches have dominated the field: while Liberalism/ Neo-Liberal Institutionalism would empathize how a state may seek to strategize its policy in an institutional setting, Realism/Neo-Realism would posit that a state’s policy is decided by its position in the international system. In this study, we would adopt a constructive approach by examining how Taiwan, as an agent, may have pondered over interacting with the structure, defined here as the systemic social norm of free trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO). As Taiwan has long been isolated in the international stage, it has to construct its national identity and understand its national interests within the emerging social context in the age of globalization, when the state has to adjust its functions. With this understanding, the new global norms are no longer perceived as merely constraints or accelerators of Taiwan’s foreign policy behavior. Rather, Taiwan is endeavoring to challenge the international political structure of no-recognizing Taiwan by being actively engaged in the WTO, alternatively perceived as the Economic United Nations. Hence, Taiwan is adjusting its agricultural policy from protective input subsidies and price supports to direct payments to the farmers. Conceptual
Framework/Theoretical Considerations
In the field
of International Relations, foreign policy determinants are usually found in
three levels of analysis (or images): individuals, states, and the system (Waltz,
1959). While this way of
classifying explanatory variables is heuristically convenient, it is
inescapably state-centered, in the sense that these variables are enlisted to
account for a state’s
inside-out foreign policy behavior and thus fail to take into account those
approaches that would emphasize system-centered phenomena (Caporaso, 1997: 565). A more serious
detrimental deficiency is that the arbitrary divide[1][1] has led to two camps of ontologically
partial theories: while structuralism/determinism would give emphasis to
systemic factors and thus neglect other factors, reductionism/voluntarism
would underscore the importance of individuals’ rational choice (Caporaso, 1997: 565-66; Clark, 1999: 41). One may continue to pretend that there
are two separate arenas where the state may successfully play two roles at
the same time as possessing split personality. However, it is doubtful whether any
political actor can afford to such market segmentation, for instance, foreign
policy rhetoric for domestic consumption. Alternatively, we may take an
additive approach by reducing all social properties to individuals and their
interactions and then combining these parts and processes. Caporaso
(1997: 566) is keen to disapprove of this individualism as it has merely
substituted “social accounting” for theoretical explanations. A more fruitful
strategy would hinge on how we may successfully design a research agenda that
may integrate, or combine both international and domestic politics
simultaneously. We may classify
various attempts at synthesis across International Relations and Comparative
Politics into two broad approaches: decision-making, international
society/world system, and structuration/constructivist theories.[2][2]
Within the decision-making framework, two models have been empirically
productive: Second Image Reversed and Two-level Game. As vividly distinguished by Caporaso (1997), while Second Image suggests domestic
causes of international effects, Second Image Reversed advances international
causes of domestic effects. For
proponents of Second Image Reversed, such external/international factors as
globalization and internationalization are perceived as opportunity,
incentive, or barrier, and thus employed to shed light on domestic policy adjustments
and political collations (Milner and Keohane,
1996). Accordingly, the causal
link identified here is only non-recursive outside-in one. Another popular
decision-making approach is Two-level Game, where a Chief of Government
(COG), equipped with his own utility function, has to play two games at two
different levels, treating both the international system and domestic
constituencies as resources and constraints (Putnam, 1988; Moravcsik, 1993).
Even though Caporaso (1997: 567)
dissatisfiedly comments that it is more a metaphor rather than any
explanatory approach, it nonetheless points to the intersection of
international and domestic influences at the Janus-faced state, the roles of
which deserve our further exploration in a later section. A second approach
takes the international society or the world system as a holistic
configuration, where the state has to find out its own comfortable
place. Seemingly
structuralism in form, models of this sort are inclined to take a domestic
analogy and thus espouse “domestification of international
politics,” to borrow the term
coined by Caporaso (1997). While underlining the overarching
maneuvering at the systemic level and thus somewhat rendering the state as a
residual category, it has intrinsically provided another non-recursive
causal, if any, outside-in link.
Nevertheless, if comprehended differently but not diametrically, it
may enlighten us how profound changes at the systemic level, whether globally
or regionally, may have challenged the states’ capabilities. One last approach on
the list takes an ontologically structuration perspective toward the
agent-structure dialects, that is, they both are parts of the
their relations and thus are mutually constituted (Wendt, 1987; Checkel, 1998; Hopf, 1998;
Barnett, 1999). Analytically, the
state is conceived as a broker between society and the international system,
thus integrating domestic politics and international politics;
methodologically, the state, by becoming the common ground, or “frontier” suggested by Rosenau (1996), for national politics and foreign policy,
serves as a convergence of Comparative Politics and International Relations.
(Clark, 1999: 2, 17). More specifically, both internal
democratization and external globalization would determine a state’s interests and
capabilities; and by interacting with both society
and the international system, the state is bound to construct its identity
(Clark, 1999: 57-58). The
approach is accordingly considered epistemologically[3][3] constructivist. In a nutshell, we
have come with three views of the state (see Figure 1): while structuralists would deem the state as subsumed by the
international system, and reductionists tend to perceive the state more
attuned with its domestic constituencies, constructivists would allow for the
state’s two-front
maneuvering, depending on how much power it possesses.
Figure 1: Three Views of the State Policy
Predispositions for Taiwan In terms of policy predispositions, while Neo-Realism would predict that a state’s foreign behavior is compelled externally by the overriding force of the international system, and Liberal-Institutionalism would allow for far more policy leverages to be exercised by the state. On the other hand, constructivism would predict that the state enjoys the liberty to engage with both domestic constituencies and external/international powers. In the following, we will illustrate how these three perspectives would direct different policy predispositions for Taiwan in calculating its national interests. Since the end of World War II, the national
interests of Taiwan have been largely defined by how it has successfully
guarantee its national security as Communist China has never ceased coveting
over Taiwan’s territory in military terms. At different stages, various national
security strategies have been suggested or implemented in Taiwan, which may
be understood from either Realist or Idealist perspective in International
Relations theories.[4][4] From the vintage point of Idealism, especially its Neo-liberal Institutional vein, collective security mechanism, global or regional, may be warranted to deter the expansionism of potential aggressors with military pacification. However, because of the obstruction from Russia and China, who possess the veto power within the Security Council of the United Nations, the universal application of the collective security instrument has unfortunately so far been circumscribed. For the past decade, Taiwan has persistently sought to reenter/join the UN, ostensibly in the hope to walk out of international isolation imposed by China. In fact, one of the most important considerations is to internationalize the peace and security of the Taiwan Straits by actively taking part in the happenings in the international society. Again, because of the uncompromising boycott by China, Taiwan has so far failed to make its telling presence in the UN arena, not to mention the application of UN collective security measure just in case China should wage a war against Taiwan. On the extreme of the ideological spectrum is
Realism in various shades, that is, how to obtain self-help through
balance-of-power in the anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979), and to
safeguard national security, conceived as military power, through forming
defensive alliance. During the
Cold War era, the US managed to forge bilateral and multilateral military
alliances with its allies all over the world to contain the Communist
bloc. Within that bipolar
competition buttressed by nuclear capabilities, Taiwan’s security was
essentially guaranteed through its Mutual Defense Treaty with the US.[5][5]
Although the US was forced to terminate its formal military and then
diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the 1970s, a Taiwan Relations Act[6][6] was passed by was US Congress to
maintain continuous relationship with Taiwan in 1979. Even though the US has deliberately
avoided any explicit military commitment to defend Taiwan, the peace-enforcement
stipulations implied within the TRA framework have rendered the US-Taiwan
relations into some quasi-military alliance as testified in the 1995-1996
missile crises across the Taiwan Straits. And, the Guidelines for Japan-US
Defense Cooperation[7][7] promulgated in 1997 was
perceived for military consolidation in order to maintain acceptable
balance-of-power in East Asia, if no to contain China. On the
economic front, Idealism/Neo-Liberalism has its say on policy
recommendations. A related preference
is “Westward Policy” in the spirit of functionalism, understood as a
ramification of the Idealism/Liberalism camp. Inspired by the development of
integration in West Europe, its proponents have preached that trade and
economic cooperation with China may eventually be conducive to the ease of
political rivalry and military conflict between Taiwan and its Chinese
adversary. Nonetheless, the
cleavages between the two are not confined to territorial disputes only. Underneath Chinese hostility toward Taiwan
is its violent opposition toward Taiwan’s legitimate existence in the
international society, which is not going to pass into oblivion because of
economic exchanges. In addition,
as there exist enormous socio-economic disparities
and disproportion in territorial size between Taiwan and China, disparate
from those between France and Germany, any vulgar analogy is bound to shut
one’s eyes to the issue of vulnerability resulting from Taiwan’s economic
dependency on China. Diametrically
different are the prescriptions offered by Realists/Neo-Realists. Wary of economic security on Taiwan’s
part, former President Lee Ten-hui espoused a
Neo-mercantilist economic policy toward China. Given the fact that China the only
country is the world that has openly waged military threat against Taiwan,
Lee’s purposeful selection of trade restraints is understandable. Nevertheless, the current Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), which came to power in May 2001, has adjusted
Taiwan’s thus far protective economic stance toward China, probably under the
ceaseless pressure from Taiwanese businessmen who expect to gain from direct
links with China.[8][8]
Some, apprehended by the conception of Neo-functionalism, have gone so
far as to aspire the eventual goal of political unification
with China as a result of deepened economic integration. Alternatively,
we argue that accession to such a non-political international organization as
the WTO had long been contemplated one paramount mission in order to break off
the international isolation under the Hallstein
doctrine imposed by Chinese since declining international status would
jeopardize the government’s legitimacy.
Taiwan, as an agent, however, is not at the mercy of the international
structure. On the contrary,
Taiwan is redefining its national interests and reconstituting its national
identity by wholeheartedly embracing any international organizations that do
not require membership in the United Nations. In the case of the WTO, economic
concessions are interpreted as a necessary cost for the de facto
recognition of Taiwan’s existence in the world stage. Accordingly, protective agricultural
policy proscribed by the current norm of free trade under the WTO has to be
phased out at all costs. As a
result, direct payments to the rice farmers are replacing various input
subsidies and price support (LIN and WU, 2000; WU and LIN, 2000).[9][9] The Evolving State Given
the new international order of globalization, while a few have hastily
heralded the end of the state,[10][10] some would admit that many states in
the Third World are at best qualified as quasi-states in the sense that they
are unable to manage, at least, economic affairs in the age of economic
interdependence and internationalization (Jackson and Sørensen,
1999; Jackson, 1990). Still,
there is a growing consensus that it is the declining importance of territorialization rather than the decline of the states
per se. Therefore, the
state has to transform itself for survival (Clark, 1999: 36-37).[11][11]
In our constructivist understanding, the pivotal role the state plays
is contingent upon its power.
A state’s power/strength is
defined by both its external sovereignty in the international society, and
its internal autonomy when facing society (Clark, 1999: 57-58). Since the
Republic of China/Taiwan was force to withdraw itself from the UN in 1991, it
has been rendered as a pariah in the world. In fact, after East Timor and
Switzerland are admitted into the UN, Taiwan becomes the only viable state
refused the UN membership. Even
if it may possesses substantive sovereignty in the sense that it has the
capacities to conduct interactions with other states, its formal sovereignty
is in the lacking given the fact that most states refuse to confer
recognition to Taiwan, which in turn deprives Taiwan of those claims to
membership in major international organizations and access to forthcoming
resources (Caporaso, 1997: 581). Meanwhile, although successive
governments of Taiwan have claim that Taiwan/
Republic of China is a sovereign independent state in every sense, its
sovereign rights are precarious.
In other words, Taiwan, as a political entity,[12][12] may have enjoyed de facto
sovereignty, but it still in need of de jure sovereignty to be
validated by the international society. On the other hand, while Taiwan’s formalistic state authority is problematically contested, the state has long substantive autonomy/strength when facing the society.[13][13] In the minimum, the strength of a state is measured by the degree how it may wage political control over domestic affairs. In the broader sense, a state’s strength is decided by how it may successfully have penetrated the society and mobilized internal resources (Clark, 1999: 56-58; Migdal, 1988: 4). Of course, both aspects of state power are reinforced by the legitimacy endowed to the government (Clark, 1999: 59-60). Taiwan, as former colony of Japan, was handed over to the Republic of China after World War II. Having been defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the civil war, the KMT Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took refuge in Taiwan in 1949, and had ever since maintained one of the longest bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the world on this island. Having being shored up by military measures, the KMT regime was further reinforced by three pillars: warding off military invasion from the People’s Republic of China, providing material incentives from economic development, and encouraging patriotism to the state as the sole legitimate successor of the millennial lineage of Chinese dynasties.[14][14] Penetrating from the fortified power center in Taipei to the peripheries, the ethnicized KMT state had maintained both horizontal and vertical divisions of labor: while the Mainlander Chinese would occupy the state apparatus, the native Taiwanese would have no choice but to stay in the private sector; while the former would monopolize political power in the central government, the latter would be indirectly controlled through divide-and-rule among combative local factions purposefully patronized by the KMT. The strong state at this party-state era is best understood as “despotic control,” to borrow the term coined by Clark (1999: 58). Migdal (1988: 35) would designate the strong state-week society combination as “pyramidal.” What broke the four-decade of the KMT party-state impasse was the unexpected succession to the presidency by Lee after Chiang Chin-kuo’s sudden demise in 1988. To avoid breakdown in the global third wave of democratization, Lee embarked on political liberalization and democratization in a piecemeal fashion, whence the authoritarian regime began to crumble. While busy consolidating his power by disarming the conservatives within his own party, Lee sought to naturalize the regime incrementally by collaborating with the then opposition DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) in a series of constitutional amendments. Also, by promoting native elites to the ruling echelon, Lee turned the KMT into a lateral seceding party,[15][15] and eventually dismantled the KMT into four political parties. Once the opposition had decided to undertake political reforms from within the system, the main arena for power transition had been national elections. The elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were normalized sequentially in 1991 and 1992. It was the native Lee Teng-hui of the KMT who became the first directly elected President in 1996, although the dissent native Chen Shui-bian of the current ruling DPP did win the second presidential election in 2000 largely as a result of the internal feud and split of the KMT. In
recollection, the state remained strong during this period of liberalization
and democratic transition, as corporatist authoritarianism was largely
intact, giving that fact that the state had maintained extensive control over
mobilizing resources. The society
had remained weak after the onslaughts by the alien-regime in the 1950s. What had compensated for declining
state’s authority was
newly gained legitimacy resulting from the process of democratization.[16][16] Tentative
Conclusions
The adjustments of
agricultural policy under the framework are best understood as a
constructivist effort made by the state of Taiwan to engage with the
international society. Here,
globalization is thus perceived as an opportunity to transform the
state. In the past, the state was
strong in terms of its coercive control. Gradually, the state power has
been enhanced in the process of democratization. Consequently, the state has
enjoyed autonomy in facing international challenges. Nevertheless, the strong state has also been conceived under the condition that the society remains weak. As Taiwan is struggling for democratic consolidation, ethnic groups, kinships, regional clans, and local factions are resisting state control and infiltrating the state apparatus. If a weak state is accompanies by an intransigently weak society, we may witness an anarchical configuration as termed by Migdal (1988: 35). It is doubtful whether the Taiwan state may continue enjoying such a liberal agricultural stance. References Barnett,
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