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American Military Posture in East
Asia: With a Special Focus on Taiwan* |
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Cheng-Feng Shih, Associate Professor
Department of Public Administration, Tamkang
University, Tamsui, TAIWAN We will build our defenses
beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge. We will meet aggression and bad
faith with resolve and strength. George W. Bush (2001/1/20) Introduction
In this study, we attempt to understand American military posture in East
Asia within the context of a US-Japan-China-South Korea-Taiwan pyramid, where
the US plays the role of benign leader at the apex. With the demise of the Soviet Union,
China has become the only power to challenge not only regionally bust also
globally. Equipped with a realist
predisposition, the Bush administration appears apt to keep a watchful eye on
the emerging competitor China, who has alarmed both the US and her allay
Japan during the 1995-96 missile crises against Taiwan. With this strategic understanding in
mind, we will seek to allure to some military arrangements contemplated by
the US. Efforts will be made to
examine five official documents already made to the public since President
George W. Bush’s inauguration, including his own the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, and the Department of Defense’s
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Nuclear Posture Review, Annual
Report to the President and the Congress, and Annual Report on the
Military Power of the Peoples’ Republic of China. Before our conclusions, we
recapitulate the US policy toward Taiwan within our broad framework. Strategic
Predispositions
In the traditional literature of International Relations, two
epistemologically rationalistic paradigms have been competing with one
another for domination: while Realism/Neo-Realism would emphasize the
rationale of national interests, security, and power, and thus stress
balance-of-power in international anarchy, Idealism/ Liberalism would focus
on the importance of international norms, institutions, and cooperation. It is therefore tempting to grossly
interpret American foreign policy behavior under Republican and Democrat
presidents into realist and liberal ones respectively. However, in their policy application,
these two ideal types are practically inadequate in the sense that there is
no straightforward isomorphic division between Republican and Democrat
administrations along the spectrum of strategic predisposition. Particularly, the analytic distinction
between containment and engagement may fade into vagueness as the presidents
may find themselves inescapably entrapped to adopt a nonpartisan posture
(Figure 1). For
instance, while the Democrat Clinton would feel more attuned to all sorts of
strategies under the umbrella of engagement, from constructive engagement to
coercive engagement, the Republic Bush may entertain a continuum of
containment in all clothes, from coercion/isolation to constraintment,
to borrow the term from Segal (2000).
It is therefore not surprising to discover that general external
orientations of both Democrat and Republic would at times converge when the
sets of engagement and containment intersect with each other, culminating
into the seemingly oxymoron of hawk engagement/preventive defense identified
by Cha (2002). In
practice, it was the Democrat Clinton who had sent two carriers to the Taiwan
Straits during the 1995-96 missile crises, which would be considered
disharmonious, if not antithetical, to his own operational code or belief
system. Similarly, we would not
be surprised if the Republican Bush should venture out of the deterrence/defense
baseline and thus choose to adopt a constraintment
gesture, let us say, in order to fortify homeland security, especially in the
aftermath of the September 11 at home. Facing
this analytic flux and related theoretic/paradigmatic deficiency that favors
parsimonious explanations, Katzenstein and Okawara (2001) recommend an “eclectic” Realist-Liberal
perspective that would explain seemingly disparate, if not contradictory, US
strategies on different issues toward Japan, that is
military alliance and economic competition.[1][1]
Nonetheless, their perspective fails to specify the conditions when a
state actor like the US would take a unified or eclectic approach. Instead, we would argue that a more
fruitful complement to the Realist/Liberal dichotomy is to go beyond the
positivist epistemology and embrace an emerging reflective Constructive lens
underscoring that ideas and values decide national
identities and interest, which in turn determine state behavior (Copeland,
2000). Taiwan Japan China Korea alliance  Figure2:
Pyramid Relationships in East Asia
In this study, we perceive the US as a lone superpower resolute to uphold a
capitalistic and democratic world order in the Post-Cold War era. Facing potential challenge from China
both globally and regionally, the US seems steadfastly determined to retain
its hegemonic status, especially in East Asia, rather than to share the
condominium with China and Japan, or to retreat from the Asian-Pacific region
and become merely a balancer.[2][2]
With this self-identity in mind, US foreign policy and strategic considerations
would be juxtaposed against a pyramid (Figure 2) in East Asia, where Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan are enlisted to form, in a minimum, a defense shield,
or/and, to the maximum, an offensive bow against China although both
engagement and containment disguises may be alternatively employed.
Embedded in this US-Japan-Korea-Taiwan strategic landscape are three
interlocked triangular relationships composed of bilateral alliances,
quasi-alliances, and some emerging semi-alliance,[3][3] which mount to
a US-centered quasi-multilateral security community is East Asia (Figure
3). So far, the US, Japan, Korea,
and even Taiwan[4][4] have disseminated symbolical and
substantive elements of engagement to placate China. Nonetheless, if China is
determined to transform itself from a land power to a maritime power,[5][5] efforts will be made to penetrate these
strategic protective arrangements.
Among the three triangles, the US-Japan-Korea one is most robust (Figure
4). While the US has forge
military alliance with Japan and South Korea (Korea, or Republic of Korea) in
1951 and 1953 respectively, the relationship between Japan and Korea have
been reinforced not only by their common threats from North Korea, but also
from their dependence on US military commitment. In what Cha’s
(2000) characterization as a “quasi-alliance,” Japan and Korea would eschew
their historical animosity and thus to enhance their relationship if their
mutual perception of US determination is declining. This triangle would not be so solid in
case when the two Koreas are unified and decide to collaborate with China to
deter Japan’s ascendance.
On
the other hand, Japan has consistently stood aloof to Taiwan even though they
shared colonial relations, though asymmetric, for half a century before the
end of the war. The Native
Taiwanese, some of whom still wholeheartedly harbor their romantic
reminiscence of the good old days before the war,[6][6] must have been distressed, if not
humiliated, by Japanese selective amnesia and blindness. Moreover, some Mainlander Taiwanese,
who themselves or whose immediate forebears were forced to take refugee in Taiwan after the Chinese Nationalists
(Kuomintang, KMT) were defeated by the Communist Chinese (CCP) in 1949, would
not shy away from their anti-Japanese sentiments lingering from the war
memory.[7][7]
Any substantive improvement between Japan and Taiwan must rest on how
they would reconcile their past.
On the part of Taiwan, particularly, domestic politics in the form of
ethnic competition needs to be de-linked with foreign policy making. Nonetheless,
after the 1995-96 missile crises in Taiwan Straits, both the US and Japan
seemed to have finally realized that they no longer could afford tolerating a
loophole in their defensive network against Chinese expansion eastwards. The revised Guidelines for Japan-US
Defense Cooperation[8][8] promulgated in 1997 was
perceived for military consolidation in order to maintain acceptable
balance-of-power in East Asia, if no to contain China. Within this new configuration, Taiwan
may probe the possibility to make great strides in forging some linkage with
Japan in the form of quasi-alliance based on hitherto solid military alliance
between the US and Japan. Of
course, an emerging Japan-Taiwan collective defense bund, thus, may also help
to upgrade current U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. However, affirmative US warrant is
predicated on the condition that Taiwan is averse to political integration
with China in any format, which has been jeopardized by Taiwan’s recent
single-minded overtures to court, if not to hedge, China.
The weakest component in the US strategic contemplation in led East Asia is
the missing US-Korea-Taiwan triangle (Figure 6). So far, there is hardly any diplomatic
relation between South Korea and Taiwan, not to mention military one.[9][9]
Animosity between them is evidenced in lack of flag-carrying airlines
between the two capitals since they broke off their formal relations in
1992. Sporadic competitions even
between their own civilians would cause displeasure, at least on the
Taiwanese part. Historical
memory, if not racist chauvinism, must have played a crucial role in this
thorny relation.[10][10]
Still, if Taiwan is ready to stage rapprochement with China, it
would be absurd to reject Korea.
After all, Korea was one of the last “powers” that yielded to China’s Hallstein Doctrine, persistent
demands for Korea’s apology would render Taiwan’s security and national
interests secondary to other considerations. New American
Military Posture
Hierarchically, military strategy is based on the guideline laid down in
defense strategy, which in turn are derived from national security
strategy. Although it is perhaps
premature to generalize how personal idiosyncratic characteristics have
determine President Bush’s foreign policy orientations,[11][11] he did reveal some Realist propensity
by declaring that the US “will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and
strength” in his inaugural address (Bush, 2001). He also exhibits similar Realist
mind-set in his National Security Strategy of the United States of America
by calling attention to “unparalleled” US military strength and economic
influence, and reiterating US intention to create a “balance of power” that
favors human freedom (Bush, 2002; 2001).
While directing three grandiose goals of freedom, peace, and human
dignity, he unfolds eight international strategies: to champing aspirations
for human dignity, strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism, defuse
regional conflicts, prevent enemies with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to
threaten the US, ignite global economic growth, expand development, develop
cooperation, and transform US national security institutions. It appears that he does not disguise
his intention to defeat enemies (p. 30) while judging deterrence ineffective
against enemies (p. 15).
Although Bush refers to terrorism as enemy and rogue states and terrorists as
challenges (2002: 5, 13), China is particularly identified as one that is
threatening its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region. He accordingly contends to seek a
“constructive relationship” with China (p. 27). He goes on to remind China that the US
is committed to the defense of Taiwan, which he attributes as “friend” (p.
3), under the Taiwan Relations Act.
The Quadrennial Defense Review Report submitted by the Department of
Defense (2001) puts forward four defense policy goals under new security
environment[12][12]: to assure allies and friends,
dissuade adversaries, deter aggression and coercion, and defeat any adversary
if deterrence fails (pp. iii-iv, 11-13).
More concretely, seven strategic tenets are identified: to manage
risks, adopt a “capabilities-based” approach to defense,[13][13] defend the US and project military
power, strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain favorable regional
balances, develop broad military capabilities, and transform defense (pp.
13-16). Accordingly, force
planning will be drawn to defend the US, deter aggression and coercion,
defeat aggression, and conduct small-scale contingency operations (pp.
17-21).
The QDR further identifies three broad categories of US national
interest: to ensure US security and freedom of action, honor international
commitments, and contribute to economic well-being (p. 2). While Northeast Asia, and East Asian
littoral are identified among other areas as critical one that the US would
preclude “hostile domination” (p. 2), the East Asian littoral is perceived as
a “particularly challenging area” (p. 4). Although not explicitly identified,
Taiwan is unmistakably located in this Asian theater stretching from the Bay
of Bengal to the Sea of Japan.
A more detailed strategic posture designed for the 21ist century is partially
unveiled in excerpts of the heatedly debated Nuclear Posture Review
submitted to the Congress by the Department of Defense (2002a).[14][14]
Under the new strategic triad (Figure 7), while traditional ICBMs,
Bombers, and SLBMs are reserved under one pillar, new impetus is given to
active and passive defenses, and revitalized defense infrastructure, with
enhanced command, control, and intelligence biding the three pillars. While non-nuclear offensive forces,
meaning conventional strike and information operation, are enlisted to
complement nuclear ones, missile defense capabilities are formally employed
to assured security partners, dissuade adversaries, deter aggression, and
defeat small-scaled missile attacks as dictated in the QDR.[15][15]
source:
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/g020109-D-6570C.html
Figure7: News Strategic Triad
Interesting enough, the Department of Defense chose not to conceal the part
on China along with six other states to use nuclear weapons[16][16] in the NPR excerpts, including
Russia, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea: Due to the combination of
China’s still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization
of its nuclear and non-nuclear forces, China is a country that could be
involved in an immediate or potential contingency.
Indirectly associated is the recognition that Taiwan is on one of the
“immediate contingencies”[17][17] when a military confrontation may take
place over its legal status contested by China, and for which the US pledges
to prepare its nuclear forces for preemptive strikes.[18][18]
Even though the QDR was released after the September 11, the US
security strategy specified largely stayed the old course as the aged-old
“two theaters” of operation remained intact, if not scantly mentioned (p.
21). Full-fledged development of
a new defense approach did not appear until the Department of Defense (2002b)
submitted its Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
including phasing out two major theater war construct, reorganizing and
revitalizing the missile defense research, reorganizing space capabilities,
enhancing homeland defense and accelerating transformation, adopting a new
approach to strategic deterrence (New Triad), and adopting a new approach to
balancing risks.[19][19] Apparently, this report is more
attuned to the NPR than the QDR.
In this report, the Asian littoral is again listed as one of critical areas
that the US is committed to prevent hostile domination. Although having not picked out China, the
report discerns that some rising and declining regional powers which are
developing or acquiring nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) capabilities
to threaten stability in regions critical to US interests. Under the heading of Asia, it
relentlessly states: Maintaining a stable
balance in Asia will be both a critical and formidable task. The possibility exists that a military
competitor with a substantial resource base will emerge in the region. The Asian littoral represents a
particular challenging area for operations. The distances are vast and the density
of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower than other critical
regions. This place a premium on
secure additional access and infrastructure agreements and on developing
systems capable of sustained operations at long distances with minimal
theater-based support.
In summer 2002, the Department of Defense (2002c) submitted its Annual
Report on the Military Power of the Peoples’ Republic of China to the
Congress, alerting China’s ballistic missile modernization, which would
upgrade its nuclear deterrence and operational capabilities for contingencies
in East Asia. The report is
keenly watchful that:[20][20] Preparing for a potential
conflict in the Taiwan Strait is the primary driver for China’s military
modernization. Beijing is
pursuing the ability to force Taiwan to negotiate on Beijing’s terms
regarding unification with the mainland.
It also seeks to deter, deny, or complicate the ability of foreign
forces to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. (p. 11) In the
section on security situation in the Taiwan Strait, it is observed that: Both Beijing and Taipei have stated that they seek
a peaceful resolution to the unification issue. However, the PRC’s ambitious military
modernization casts a cloud over its declared preference for resolving
differences with Taiwan through peaceful means. Beijing has refused to renounce the
use of force against Taiwan and has listed several circumstances under which
it would take up arms against the island. . . . Beijing’s primary political
objective in any Taiwan-related crisis, however, likely would be to compel
Taiwan authorities to enter into negotiations on Beijing’s terms and to
undertake operations with enough rapidity to precluded third-party
intervention. (p. 46) The DoD also shows its grave concern in the report that
China’s 300 modernized conventional SRBMs would pose as an effective
conventional strike force against Okinawa when forwardly deployed, or against
Taiwan[21][21] when deployed further inland (pp. 2,
25, 50-51), fretting that “Taiwan’s ability to defend against ballistic
missiles is negligible.” (p. 51)[22][22]
Most ominous is the frightful account that: The PLA’s offensive
capabilities improve as each year passes, providing Beijing with an
increasing number of credible options to intimate or actually attack Taiwan.
. . . The PLA also could adopt a decapitation strategy, seeking to neutralize
Taiwan’s political and military leadership on the assumption that their
successors would adopt policies more favorable to Beijing. (p. 47) No
less alarming is the prospect that three scenarios of coercive options have
been contemplated by China: information operations, air and missile
campaigns, and naval blockades.
If coercion fails, outright Chinese invasion is expected to follow (p.
48). The US-China Security Review
Commission (2002) even envisages that once missile attacks are launched,
China would continue the strike until Taiwan surrenders.
The Department of Defense (2002c) appears worrisome that China’s secure
control over Taiwan would eventually “allow the PRC to move its defensive
perimeter further seaward.” (p. 10)
The DoD plainly realizes that China’s
military modernization is not only planned against Taiwan, but also at
incurring the US risks in case of Taiwan contingency in the future (p
50). To be sure, the DoD is adamant that whether China would succeed in its
military campaigns is largely decided by how Taiwan may receive firm support
from the US.
Reflecting the basic tenet of the Taiwan Relations Act, the Department
of Defense (2000) has already pledged that: It is the policy of the United States to consider
any effort to determinate the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the
Western pacific area and of great concern to the United States; to provide
Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of
the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the
people of Taiwan. The Department of Defense
(2000) has affirmed: The United States takes
its obligation to assist Taiwan in maintaining a self-defense capacity very
seriously. This is not only
because it is mandated by U.S. law in the TRA, but also because it is our own
national interest.
Therefore, the US military commitment to Taiwan is determined by how the
former would conceive of itself in terms of the existence of the latter. Evolving American
Policy toward Taiwan Since the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the
US has witnessed eleven administrations, from Truman to Bush, and its
relationship with Taiwan/Republic of China (ROC) has undergone fluctuating
alternation. The honeymoon
between the two countries from the wartime alliance plumped to the lowest
point in 1949 when the Truman administration adopted its hand-off policy
toward the Chinese civil war and waited to see the annexation of Taiwan by
the Communist Chinese. The US
policy was unexpectedly reversed after the Korean War broke out in 1950, when
the Seventh Fleet was dispatched to protect Taiwan. The US-Taiwan relations turned into a military
alliance and thus reached its peak when a Mutual Defense Treaty was
signed in 1954. By and large, the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations retained closer relations with Taiwan,
especially during the heydays of the Vietnam War. However, once the Nixon and Ford
administrations were resolved to court China in faithful pursuit of
Kissinger’s grand strategy of fighting an
one-and-half war against the Soviet Union, Taiwan was gradually
abandoned. The amiable
relationship came to another slump in 1979 when the Carter administration
decided to derecognize the ROC and established foreign relation with the PRC.
Regardless, a Taiwan Relations Act was
promulgated in the same year, which stands as the watershed of American
policy toward Taiwan. Before the TRA,
Taiwan had long been treated as but one component of the US global strategic
thinking to counter China.
Thereafter, the US has been more inclined to look at its separate
relations with Taiwan detached from China although the US considerations in
these days have to be constrained by Chinese claim of Taiwan’s territory in
their mutual pursuit of accommodation. So far, the most important indicator of the
evolution of the US policy toward Taiwan has been its contemplation of the
legal status of Taiwan. Until
1950 the US had persistently taken the position that Taiwan was part of
China. To justify its protection
of Taiwan after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration
declared that the legal status of Taiwan was uncertain and should be settled
internationally. The policy
lasted until 1972, when the U.S. formally acknowledged in the Shanghai Communiqué[23][23] that “all Chinese on either side of
the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only but China and Taiwan is a part
of China.” In the 1979 Joint
Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United
States and the People Republic of China,[24][24] the US “acknowledge the Chinese position that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China.”
Similarly in the 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communiqué (or 817
Communiqué),[25][25] it is reiterated that the US “acknowledged the Chinese position
that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” (emphases added) While the so-called “One China Policy” has been
embodied in the “Three Communiqués” between the PRC and the US, of which the
contents may have varied and been subject to different interpretations over
the years with changing contexts, it is categorically different from the “One
China Principle” espoused by China.
Rationally speaking, one China carries a host of connotations along
the spectrum from One China＝PRC (Taiwan
incorporated), One China＝Two Governments (CCP
& KMT/DPP), One China＝ROC, One China＝Historical, Cultural,
Geographical China, and One China＝One
China＋One Taiwan. Still, it must be pointed out that the
TRA has nothing like “Taiwan is a part of China.” Since not all interpretations are
contradictory, the US has long chosen to keep all options open to be decided
by Taiwan and China themselves.”
Since “One China Policy” does not necessarily negate the possibility
of recognizing a Republic of Taiwan, this purposeful ambiguity has left an
ample space for proponents of the Taiwan Independence Movement in their
pursuit of establishing an independent Republic of Taiwan. The other manifestation has been American
commitment to Taiwan’s defense as stipulated in the TRA. Although the administrations since
Carter have calculated to be vague over whether the US would send troops to
defend Taiwan in case of war, peaceful resolutions between the Taiwan Strait
have so far been faithful followed.
As the US has designated in the TRA that the security issue of
Taiwan is beyond any challenge, it has been unconditionally invoked to
demonstrate the US commitment to defend Taiwan, suggesting its primacy over
the 817 Communiqué, which was vividly demonstrated in the 1995-96
Missile Crises, when Clinton sent USS Nimitz and USS Independence to deter
China, testifying again that the security of Taiwan as guaranteed in the TRA
outweighs other policy considerations. In the main, the Clinton administration adopted a
strategy of “Comprehensive Engagement” with China in the post-Cold War
era. A
devastating punch come from the “Three No’s” during Clinton’s visit in
China in 1998.[26][26] On the other hand, President George W.
Bush no longer considers China as a “constructive strategic partner,”[27][27] but rather a competitor in a global
strategic design focused on the Asian-Pacific region. So far, while President Bush has shown
his reluctance to mention the three, now out of date, Communiqués, he has
also recurrently demonstrated his goodwill toward Taiwan. For instance, he openly pledged
to do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself” in case China attack
Taiwan,[28][28] promised to help Taiwan joining the
World Health Organization (WHO), and even referred to Taiwan as “Republic of
Taiwan.”[29][29] Before he embarked on his trip to East
Asia in April 2002, he called attention to Taiwan as “good friend” along with
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines.[30][30]
While speaking to the Japanese Diet, he reiterated American
“commitments to the people on Taiwan.”[31][31]
At a press conference in Beijing, he brought up the Taiwan
Relations Act in front of Chinese President Jiang Zemin[32][32]; again, he wasted no time reminding
the Chinese audience of the US “commitment to Taiwan” and avouching American
determination to “help Taiwan defend herself if provoked” by invoking the Taiwan
Relations Act while delivering a speech in Tsinghua University, Beijing.[33][33]
In return for Chinese clamor for “peaceful unification,” he retorted
with such expressions as “peaceful settlement” and “peaceful settlement.” Although Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
was recently forced to answer that the US does “not support independence for
Taiwan” while challenged by a compound question uttered by a journalist from
Taiwan,[34][34] he was said to have expressed his
regret for any inconvenience incurred to the Taiwanese. Regarding the standard responses in
the form of “being opposed to” or “not to support” Taiwan independence, we
may come with two rational interpretations. For one thing, while the US would not
allow China to swallow Taiwan because of American interest, it leaves up to
the Taiwanese to decide whether they would get rid of the iron cage under the
Republic of China. Furthermore,
it is beneficial to the Taiwanese if the US openly unveil her intention not
to involve herself on the issue of Taiwan independence as the Chinese would
not have any opportunity to accuse the US meddle in Taiwanese exercising
their right to self-determination. Conclusions In retrospection, the relationships between the US
and Taiwan in the past two decades had been amount to a quasi-alliance in
short of the status of free association.
What has been left out is the determination of the Taiwanese to seek
an independent Republic of Taiwan.
As a setter’s state, the US share with Taiwan’s passion to breakaway from the chains imposed it by the former land
of origin since the norm of self-determination is the highest form of human
rights. The Taiwanese have the
same right to decide their destiny as the Americans did according to the
principle of people’s sovereignty.
As the nation-state is still the standard bearer of people even in the
post-Cold War ear, Taiwan, in its legitimate quest
for a de jure independent
statehood, deserve its fair share in the international arena and ought not to
be deemed as a reckless troublemaker. Nevertheless, the people of Taiwan need to reach a
consensus on Taiwan’s future even though they may retain dissimilar, but not
necessarily contradictory, outlook of national identity. The ruling elite, not the US, is to be
blamed for Taiwan’s isolation because of their partisan manipulations of this
issue. Eventually, the bottom
line is whether the Taiwanese do request a nation-state of their own choice,
not any state imposed. The real
issue we are facing is Chinese irredentism to incorporate Taiwan, not
Taiwanese secession from China.
After all, the current Chinese government has never reigned on
Taiwan. Nonetheless, as along as
the Taiwanese consider themselves as ethnic Chinese in primordial
conceptions, racially or/and culturally, they are mentally destined to
imprison themselves in Chinese political penitentiary and economic
abyss. The ultimate trial for the
Taiwanese would be the following: if China becomes politically democratic and
economically developed, how many Taiwanese would choose to get unified with
China? How many people would
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