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Emerging Taiwan-America-Japan Triangular Relations* |
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Cheng-Feng Shih, Associate Professor Department of Public Administration, Tamkang
University Associate Researcher, Taiwan National Security Institute
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Taiwan’s National Security
Strategies Since the end of
World War II, as Communist China has never ceased coveting over Taiwan’s
territory,[1][1] the national interests of Taiwan have
been largely defined by how it has successfully guarantee its national
security.[2][2]
At different stages, various national securities have been suggested
or implemented in Taiwan, which may be understood from either Realist or
Idealist perspective in the International Relations theories.[3][3] From the vintage
point of Idealism, especially Neo-liberal Institutionalism, collective
security mechanism, global or regional, may be warranted to deter the
expansionism of potential aggressors with military pacification. However, because of the obstruction
from Russia and China, who possess the veto power within the Security Council
of the United Nations, the universal application of the collective security
instrument has unfortunately so far been circumscribed. For the past decade, Taiwan has
persistently sought to reenter/join the UN, ostensibly in the hope to walk
out of international isolation imposed by the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). In fact, one of the most
important considerations is to internationalize the peace and security of the
Taiwan Straits by actively taking part in the happenings in the international
society. Again, because of the
uncompromising boycott by China, Taiwan has so far failed to make its telling
presence in the UN arena, not to mention the application of UN collective
security measure just in case China should wage a war against Taiwan. Although former President Lee Ten-hui had in the past relentlessly called for the
establishment of an Asian collective security arrangement, one precondition
of such a security structure is the consent from the great power of East
Asia, that is, Japan and China, as well as the approval from the lone super
power in the world, the United States. Alternatively, some
have unwaveringly proposed robust engagement with the ASEAN countries, a
strategy formally pronounced as “Southward Policy.” While the ASEAN established a Regional
Forum (ARF) in 1994, with an eye to conduct multilateral official dialogues
on security issues, particularly the exercise of preventive diplomacy,[4][4] it is still far away from
institutionalization as developed in the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As
is well known, the US had during the Cold War era preferred bilateral
cooperation to multilateral security framework. While it has demonstrated more
comfortable disposition toward multilateralism, it is yet not clear whether
the US would have any slight idea in contemplating the ARF for alleviating
the tension between China and Taiwan.
Also, as an acquisitive dragon on their borders, it is doubtful these
wary ASEAN nations would offer Taiwan any opportunity for its presence. Moreover, Taiwan has in the past shown
scanty attention to its ASEAN neighbors, it would be laborious for Taiwan to
become member simply based on geographical and ethnic Malayo-Polynesian
affinities.[5][5] A third approach is “Westward Policy” in the spirit of functionalism. Inspired by the development of integration in West Europe, its proponents have preached that trade and economic cooperation with China may eventually be conducive to the ease of political rivalry and military conflict between Taiwan and its Chinese adversary. Nonetheless, the cleavages between the two are not confined to territorial disputes only. Underneath Chinese hostility toward Taiwan is its violent opposition toward Taiwan’s legitimate existence in the international society, which is not going to pass into oblivion because of economic exchanges. In addition, as there exist enormous socio-economic disparities and disproportion in territorial size between Taiwan and China, disparate from those between France and Germany, any vulgar analogy is bound to shut one’s eyes to the issue of vulnerability resulting from Taiwan’s economic dependency on China. Wary of economic security on Taiwan’s part, former President Lee Ten-hui espoused a Neo-mercantilist economic policy toward China. Given the fact that China the only country is the world that has openly waged military threat against Taiwan, Lee’s purposeful selection of trade restraints is understandable. Nevertheless, the current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which came to power in May 2001, has adjusted Taiwan’s thus far protective economic stance toward China, probably under the ceaseless pressure from Taiwanese businessmen who expect to gain from direct links with China. Some, apprehended by the conception of Neofunctionalism, have gone so far as to aspire the eventual goal of political unification with China as a result of deepened economic integration.
A fourth
strategy has been faithfully followed in pursuant to the basic tenet of
Realism, that is, how to obtain self-help through balance-of-power in the
anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979), and to safeguard national
security, conceived as military power, through forming collective defensive
alliance. During the Cold War
era, the US managed to forge bilateral and multilateral military alliances
with its allies all over the world to contain the Communist bloc. Within that bipolar competition
buttressed by nuclear capabilities, Taiwan’s security was essentially
guaranteed through its Mutual Defense Treaty with the US.[6][6]
Although the US was forced to terminate its formal military and then
diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the 1970s, a Taiwan Relations Act[7][7] was passed by was US Congress to
maintain continuous relationship with Taiwan in 1979. Even though the US has deliberately
avoided any explicit military commitment to defend Taiwan, the
peace-enforcement stipulations implied within the TRA framework have rendered
the US-Taiwan relations into some quasi-military alliance as testified in the
1995-1996 missile crises across the Taiwan Straits.[8][8] As the international
system has undergone drastic structural changes with the demise of the Soviet
Union in 1991, China’s relative importance in American calculation of global
strategy has been effectively dwindled.[9][9]
While Chinese military spending had remained stable in the 1980s, it
began to grow at a greater pace.
So far, watchful American Sinologists have not reached any consensus
regarding whether Chinese military modernization would cause any threat to
the US.[10][10]
Still, the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation[11][11] promulgated in 1997 was
perceived for military consolidation in order to maintain acceptable
balance-of-power in East Asia, if no to contain China.[12][12]
Within this new configuration, Taiwan may probe the possibility to
further mutual military linkage with Japan based on hitherto solid military
alliance between Japan and the US.
An emerging Taiwan-US-Japan collective defense bund, thus, may help to
upgrade current American security commitment to Taiwan. In so conception, “Eastward Policy” is
still the ultimate insurance for Taiwan’s national security. However, as the military is still
engulfed in unyielding anti-Japanese sentiment, if not resentment, left over
from the former Nationalist Chinese government of the Chiang’s, “Northward
Policy” had in the past not been seriously undertaken. Evolving American Policy
toward Taiwan Since the conclusion
of World War II in 1945, the United States has witnessed eleven
administrations, from Truman to Bush, and its relationship with
Taiwan/Republic of China (ROC) has undergone fluctuating alternation. The honeymoon between the two
countries from the wartime alliance plumped to the lowest point in 1949 when
the Truman administration adopted its hand-off policy toward the Chinese
civil war and waited to see the annexation of Taiwan by the Communist
Chinese. After t the Korean War
in 1950, when the Seventh Fleet was dispatched to protect Taiwan, the
American policy was unexpectedly reversed. The Taiwan-America relations turned
into a military alliance and thus reached its peak when a Mutual Defense
Treaty was signed in 1954. By and
large, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations retained closer relations with
Taiwan, especially during the heydays of the Vietnam War. However, once the Nixon and Ford
administrations were resolved to court China in faithful pursuit of Kissinger’s
grand strategy of fighting an one-and-half war
against the Soviet Union, Taiwan was gradually abandoned. The amiable relationship came to
another slump in 1979 when the Carter administration decided to derecognize
the ROC and established foreign relation with the PRC. Regardless, the TRA
was promulgated in the same year, which stands as the watershed of American
policy toward Taiwan. Before the
TRA, Taiwan had long been treated as but one component of the American global
strategic thinking to counter the PRC.
Thereafter, the US has been more inclined to look at its separate
relations with Taiwan detached from China although American considerations in
these days have to be constrained by Chinese claim of Taiwan’s territory in
their mutual pursuit of accommodation. So far, the most
important indicator of the evolution of American policy toward Taiwan has
been American contemplation of the legal status of Taiwan. Until 1950 the US had persistently
taken the position that Taiwan was part of China. To justify its protection of Taiwan
after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration declared that
the legal status of Taiwan was uncertain and should be settled
internationally. The policy
lasted until 1972 when the US formally acknowledged
in the Shanghai Communiqué[13][13] that “all Chinese on either side of
the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only but China and Taiwan is a part
of China.” In the 1979 Joint
Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States
and the People Republic of China,[14][14] the US “acknowledge the Chinese position that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China.”
Similarly in the 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communiqué,[15][15] it is reiterated that the US “acknowledged the Chinese position
that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” (emphases added) While the so-called
“One China Policy” has been embodied in the “Three Communiqués” between the
PRC and the US, of which the contents may have varied and been subject to different
interpretations over the years with changing contexts, it is categorically
different from the “One China Principle” espoused by China. Rationally speaking, one China carries
a host of connotations along the spectrum from One China＝PRC (Taiwan
incorporated), One China＝Two Governments (CCP &
KMT/DPP), One China＝ROC, One China＝Historical,
Cultural, Geographical China, and One China＝One China＋One Taiwan. Still, it must be pointed out that the
TRA has nothing like “Taiwan is a part of China.” Since not all interpretations are
contradictory, the US has long chosen to keep all options open to be decided
by Taiwan and China themselves.”
Since “One China Policy” does not necessarily negate the possibility
of recognizing a Republic of Taiwan, this purposeful ambiguity has left an
ample space for proponents of the Taiwan Independence Movement in their
pursuit of establishing an independent Republic of Taiwan. The other
manifestation has been American commitment to Taiwan’s defense as stipulated
in the TRA. Although the
administrations since Carter have calculated to be vague over whether the US
would send troops to defend Taiwan in case of war, peaceful resolutions
between the Straits of Taiwan has so far been faithful followed. As the US has
designated in the TRA that the security issue of Taiwan is beyond any
challenge, the TRA has been unconditionally invoked to demonstrate American
commitment to defend Taiwan, suggesting its primacy over the 817 Communiqué,
which was vividly demonstrated in the 1995-96 Missile Crises, when Clinton
sent Nimitz and Independence to deter China, testifying again that the
security of Taiwan as guaranteed in the TRA outweighs other policy
considerations. This entrustment
is further reinforced after the revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guideline was
promulgated in 1997. In the main, the
Clinton administration adopted a strategy of “Comprehensive Engagement” with
China in the post-Cold War era. A devastating punch come from the “Three No’s” during
Clinton’s visit in China in 1998.[16][16]
On the other hand, President George W. Bush no longer considers China
as a “constructive strategic partner,”[17][17] but rather a competitor in a global
strategic design focused on the Asian-Pacific region, which has been
certified the recently released Annual Report on the Military Power of the
Peoples’ Republic of China prepared by the American Department of
Defense,[18][18] and the report to Congress of the
US-China Security Review Commission, entitled the National Security
Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United Stats and China.[19][19]
So far, while President Bush has shown his reluctance to mention the
three, now out of date, Communiqués, he has also recurrently demonstrated his
goodwill toward Taiwan. For
instance, he openly pledged to do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend
herself” in case China attack Taiwan,[20][20] promised to help Taiwan joining the
World Health Organization (WHO), and even referred to Taiwan as “Republic of
Taiwan.”[21][21] Before he embarked on his trip to East
Asia in April 2002, he called attention to Taiwan as “good friend” along with
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines.[22][22]
While speaking to the Japanese Diet, he reiterated American
“commitments to the people on Taiwan.”[23][23]
At a press conference in Beijing, he brought up the Taiwan Relations
Act in front of Chinese President Jiang Zemin[24][24]; again, he wasted no time reminding
the Chinese audience of the American “commitment to Taiwan” and avouching
American determination to “help Taiwan defend herself if provoked” by
invoking the Taiwan Relations Act while delivering a speech in Tsinghua
University, Beijing.[25][25]
In return for Chinese clamor for “peaceful unification,” he retorted
with such expressions as “peaceful settlement” and “peaceful settlement.” Although American
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was recently forced to answer that
the US does “not support independence for Taiwan” while challenged by a
compound question uttered by a journalist from Taiwan,[26][26] he was said to have expressed regretfulness for any inconvenience incurred to the
Taiwanese. Regarding the standard
responses in the form of “being opposed to” or “not to support” Taiwan
independence, we may come with two rational interpretations. For one thing, while the US would not
allow China to swallow Taiwan because of American interest, it leaves up to
the Taiwanese to decide whether they would get rid of the iron cage under the
Republic of China. Furthermore,
it is beneficial to the Taiwanese if the US openly unveil her intention not
to involve herself on the issue of Taiwan independence as the Chinese would
not have any opportunity to accuse the US meddle in Taiwanese exercising
their right to self-determination. In retrospection,
the relationships between the US and Taiwan in the past two decades had been
amount to a quasi-alliance in short of the status of free association. What remains to be seen is whether or
not the US would protect, if not to send troops to Taiwan, in case China
should invade the island after Taiwan has formally declared independence. Seven Scenarios to the Future Based on the Structural Realist perspective
of Kenneth Waltz (1979), we have shown that the dyadic US-Taiwan interaction
may be treated as one link of the regional US-China-Taiwan triangle in East
Asia, which in turns until the later 1990s been dependent on the
configuration of the global US-USSR-China triangle. When the structure of the global system
changed, manifested in terms of the realignment of the three Powers, the
parts had to adjust themselves in order to preserve their own interests. These adjustments in turns led to
structural changes in the regional sub-system whence the units in the
sub-system again needed to rearrange their positions. These dynamics largely explain the US
policy toward Taiwan over the 50 years. In the period of
1945-91, the global triangle[27][27] was composed of the US, the USSR, and
China, while the regional one in East Asia is made of the US, China, and the
Taiwan. We may view the Taiwan-US
relationship as but a link of the China-US-Taiwan triangle, which is in turns
dependent on the global USSR-US-China triangle. When the structure of the global
triangle varies, the three actors in the former triangle have to adjust among
themselves. The global triangle
had evolved from a balanced triangle or a quasi-bipolar (US vs. USSR+China) in the 1960s, to an unstable and loose
triangle in the 1970s, and finally to another balanced triangle or an embryo
bipolar matrix (US+China vs. USSR) in the
1980s. The regional
China-US-Taiwan triangle had subsequently evolved from a stable one in the
1960s and, to a less degree in the 1970s, to an unstable one in the 1980s. Even with the breakup of the USSR in
1991 and the US left as the lonely superpower, the regional triangle in East
Asia has largely remained the same. The Taiwan-US
relationship, evolving from tight military allies to loose partners, has
basically a function of fundamental structural changes of the international
system. Although the asymmetric
relationship between the US and Taiwan has stayed relatively the same since
1950, the stability is slightly fluctuating. The structure of the global triangle
underwent a spectacular change in the late 1960s when the feud between the
two communist partners turned into war.
The development offered a favorable opportunity for the rapprochement
between the US and China. After
the US-China normalization in 1979, the global structural change entailed the
restructuring within the regional triangle. With the demise of the Soviet Empire,
the importance of China as an American counterweight against the USSR has
disappeared. At the regional level,
this means the US will be less willing to compromise on the Taiwan
issue. Logically, the
triangular relationship may have eight possible configurations. We may classify them into four modes: ménage
à trios, romantic triangle, stable
marriage, and mutual exclusion.
According to cognition theory, while ménage
à trios and stable marriage are stable
relationships, romantic triangle and mutual exclusion are unstable ones (Heider, 1946).
See Dittmer (1981) for the discussion of the former three. Starting with the
current unstable regional triangle (S0 in Figure 2), we may come
up with seven possible scenarios for the US-China-Taiwan relationships: S1,
S2, and S3 are first-order derivations, S4,
S5, and S6 are second-order ones,
and S7 is a third-order one.
It is noted that while the three second-order modes are unstable, the other four modes are stable. It is assumed that high-level
derivation is less tenable since more efforts are needed in order to
transform the configurations sequentially. If the positive
Taiwan-US relationship is to be maintained, in order to maintain a balanced
regional triangle, there are two possibilities: either the PRC-Taiwan link is
transformed into friendly one (S1), or the PRC-US link has to
shift back to inimical one as in the 1960s and 1970s (S2). Judging from the recent development of
growing strategic need and economic ties between the US and the PRC, their
relationship can only grow closer and hence the latter possibility seems less
probable. This leaves the former
option, that is, a harmonious PRC-Taiwan relationship, more tenable. On the other hand,
is it conceivable that the Taiwan-US relationship should turn sour or
negative in the context of a balanced regional triangle? One can imagine the possibility that
the US should decide to embrace the PRC in all respects and to turn its back
on Taiwan (S3). To
attain regional balance under this configuration, the US has to sacrifice its
economic tie with Taiwan and scratch its moral commitment underwritten in the
Taiwan Relation Act. S4 may
develop from S1 or S3. First of all, for some unknown
reasons, the amicable US-Taiwan relationships embedded in the peaceful
regional triangle turn sour while China keep equal cordial relations with
both the US and Taiwan. In this
sense, a seemingly tranquil triangle East Asia may be transient; if the
peacemaking between China and Taiwan is not endorsed by the US, this
settlement may turn out costly for Taiwan since the US would back away from
its security commitment. Secondly, Taiwan may
decide to embrace China after desperately perceiving isolated by both China
and the US, which means China comes to Taiwan’s rescue in the latter’s
diplomatic isolation. In some
sense, the transformations represent Taiwan’s determination to switch its
friendship from the US to China.
It will take place only when the Taiwanese feel obliged to integrate
with China because of economic, political, or cultural affinities. One can imagine when the above
conditions will be made: economic prosperity, political democracy, or cultural
identity. At this point, it all
depends the Taiwanese what is their thought to have their own body political
Taiwan. S5 may arrive from S1 or S2. For one thing, the seemingly untroubled regional triangle may grow unstable because of the rift between the US and China somehow deteriorates and turns into full-scale conflicts. This is highly probable given the undisguised competition between the two giants in all spheres after the breakup of the Soviet Union. At this juncture, Taiwan has to strike a delicate balance between the US, a longtime allay, and China, a hegemonic neighbor. First-order Second-order Tired-order
Figure 2: Seven Scenarios to the Future Alternatively,
Taiwan may seek to improve its relationships with China after Taiwan’s
alliance with the US is firmly secured.
This contour may take place when an isolated China seeks to break the
impasse by making peace with Taiwan.
At this juncture, it is imperative that Taiwan should obtain understanding
fro the fraternal US; otherwise, a neglectful US
may feel unwilling to render its support in case a ready China makes up its
mind to absorb Taiwan. S6 may
follow from S2 or S3. In the beginning, Taiwan may take
steps to secede its cooperation with the US even when China, Taiwan’s foe,
collides with the US. This is an
unwise calculation for Taiwan by giving up its only patron in this
region. On the other hand, the
development may be conceived an improvement from total isolation by both the
US and China. At least, Taiwan
does not have to fight a two-front war with collaborated China and the
US. In other words, the
relinquishment of the relationships with the US can only be barely
compensated by an equally disruption of those between the US and China. The least plausible
scenario is the one that the PRC-Taiwan link somehow turns amicable, such as
a forced unification, and the PRC-US link turns hostile (S7). This configuration is less probable in
two counts: firstly, the development is not called for by the US unless it
finally comes to conflict with the PRC; and secondly, a rift between the US
and Taiwan is against American national interest given the enormous economic
stakes on the island. In our assessments,
Taiwan’s preference would be: S1＞S2＞S5＞S0＞S4＞S6＞S3＞S7. From the standing
point from Taiwan, whether peace (S1), alliance with the US (S2),
or even equal distance with the US and China (S5) is an
improvement of the status quo (S0). Since peace (S1) and
alliance (S2) are stable configurations, they would yield more
utility than does equidistance (S5); furthermore, equidistance (S5)
would suggest degrade relationships with the US and thus is deemed less
acceptable than peace (S1) and alliance (S2). Moreover, any frames whence Taiwan
would dispute with the US (S4, S6, S3, and S7)
are considered deviated from the statues quo (S0). While Taiwan’s absorption by China is
totally undesirable, hostile US-China relations (S6) are
better than amiable ones (S3) when Taiwan attempts to
confront both the US and China.
Finally, when Taiwan stands opposed to the US, a China détente with
both the US and Taiwan (S4) is preferable to one hostile to the
rest (S6) since the former is only one step to peace (S1)
and the later is one step to absorption (S7). The preference for
the US would take the following: S1＞S0＞S2＞S5＞S3＞S4＞S6＞S7. We assume that peace
is the best scenario (S1) and the absorption of Taiwan by China (S7)
is the worst one in the eyes of the US.
It is arguable whether the status quo (S0) is much
desirable than an alliance with Taiwan against China (S2). During the Clinton administration, the
order seemed to have been S0＞S2,
judging from the priority given to comprehensive. Nonetheless, the predisposition may be
reversed (S2＞S0) if a hegemonic
China is prepared to challenge the US during the Bush administration. Given the conditions that China has
set out to confront the US and that the US is determined to retain
affectionate relationships with Taiwan, it is not obvious whether it is
preferable for the US that Taiwan would seek cooperative relationship with
China or not. We may probe the
ranking from two perspectives.
Firstly, the triangle where an alliance with Taiwan is formed (S2)
is more stable than one where Taiwan would keep equal distance with both the
US and China (S5).
Secondly, Taiwan’s equidistance is less desirable in American
viewpoint since Taiwan would take a more active role in the triangular
interactions. Any scenarios in
short of Taiwan’s intimate association with the US (S3, S4,
and S6) are deemed acceptable given American crucial stakes in
Taiwan. If it turns out that the
US has to forge cooperative relationships with China at the expense of Taiwan,
it is preferable for the US that Taiwan stays aloof from China (S3＞S4)
because it would not allow China to take a more dominant role in the
three-way maneuver. While
intrinsically unstable, an all-against-all regional configuration is less
desirable for the US than one where China manages to take an equidistance
stance towards both the US and Taiwan given the fact that the US can still
count on China to deal with Taiwan. From the above analyses, we may come up with some commonalities between the US and Taiwan in the triangular relationships among the US, Taiwan, and China. First of all, the US and Taiwan share the first choice of peace in East Asia (S1), and distaste the possibility of Taiwan being absorbed by China (S7). Secondly, they both would consider any chilly relations between them undesirable even though they differ in the preference over these possible scenarios (S3, S4, and S6). The major differences would be found in their disparate interpretations of whether the status quo is preferable. In Taiwan’s view, any improvement of the current semi-official relationships with the US is welcome, whether alliance with the US (S2) or equidistance with both the US and China (S5). As we have noticed earlier, if China makes up its mind to counter the US, an alliance with Taiwan would eventually take precedence over the status quo (S2＞S0).
Taiwan Korea Figure 3: Pyramid in East Asia The missing link in
an emerging Taiwan-US-Japan triangle is Japan. Although the dyadic relationships
between the US and Japan and between the US and Taiwan have been robust,
conceivable linkage between Japan and Taiwan has yet failed to materialize. While the United Kingdom and France
have steadfastly maintained comfortable, if not intimate, relationships with
their former colonies, Japan has chosen to stay aloof from its only colony,
Taiwan. The Taiwanese, some of
whom still wholeheartedly harbor their romantic reminiscence of the good old
days before the war,[29][29] must have been distressed, if not
humiliated, by Japanese selective amnesia.[30][30]
On the other hand, for known reasons beyond our comprehension, our
Japanese neighbor seems content with her subservience to China, even with a
flap on the face. Equipped with
her political democracy, economic affluence, and technological supremacy,
there is no reason why Japan would refuse to become a “normal state,”[31][31] in the sense that she is willing to
contribute to peace and security in East Asia by assuming military
obligations comparable to her economic strength. Conclusions What has been left
out is the determination of the Taiwanese to seek an independent Republic of
Taiwan. As a distinct people with
its own history and national identity, the Taiwanese people have never been
offered the opportunity to exercise their right of national
self-determination. As a setter’s
state, the US share with Taiwan’s passion to breakaway
from the chains imposed it by the former land of origin since the norm of self-determination
is the highest form of human rights.
The Taiwanese have the same right to decide their destiny as the
Americans did according to the principle of people’s sovereignty. As the nation-state is still the
standard bearer of people even in the post-Cold War ear,
Taiwan, in its legitimate quest for a de
jure independent statehood, deserve its fair share in the international
arena and ought not to be deemed as a reckless troublemaker. And the future status of Taiwan should
not be confined by or linked to the terms or framework dictated by others,
especially China. With this in
mind, any effort to mediate between Taiwan and China as two separate
sovereign states that may eventually lead to peaceful resolution, not
unification, across the Taiwan Strait is welcome. Nevertheless, the
people of Taiwan need to reach a consensus on Taiwan’s future even though
they may retain dissimilar, but not necessarily contradictory, outlook of
national identity. The ruling
elite, not the US, is to be blamed for Taiwan’s isolation because of their
partisan manipulations of this issue.
After all, the US has not categorically said that it is opposed to an
independent Republic of Taiwan.
As implicitly hidden in the TRA, the law is applicable to “the
governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the
Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing
authorities.” Also the
value-loaded terms “people of Taiwan” rather than the more neutral term
“population of Taiwan’ is invariably employed in the TRA and other documents,
suggesting the prospect of any independent Taiwan if the Taiwanese should
choose to exercise their right of self-determination. Eventually, the
bottom line is whether the Taiwanese do request a nation-state of their own
choice, not any state imposed.
The real issue we are facing is Chinese irredentism to incorporate
Taiwan, not Taiwanese secession from China. After all, the current Chinese
government has never reigned on Taiwan.
Nonetheless, as along as the Taiwanese consider themselves as ethnic
Chinese in primordial conceptions, racially or/and culturally, they are
mentally destined to imprison themselves in Chinese political penitentiary
and economic abyss. The ultimate
trial for the Taiwanese would be the following: if China becomes politically
democratic and economically developed, how many Taiwanese would choose to get
unified with China? How many
people would reply definitively positive? References
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* Paper delivered at the International Symposium on
National Security in West Pacific, organized by the Taiwan National Security
Institute, Taipei, August 17, 2002. |
