American
Policy toward Taiwan ¢w
From the Past into the Future
Cheng-Feng Shih
Associate Professor, Tamkang University
2002/6/17
Introudction
Since the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the United States has witnessed eleven administrations, from Truman to Bush, and its relationship with Taiwan/Republic of China (ROC) has undergone fluctuating alternation. The honeymoon between the two countries from the wartime alliance plumped to the lowest point in 1949 when the Truman administration adopted its hand-off policy toward the Chinese civil war and waited to see the annexation of Taiwan by the Communist Chinese. After the out-break of the Korean War, the American policy was unexpectedly reversed and subsequently reached its peak in 1954, when a Mutual Defense Treaty was signed. The amiable relationship came to another slump in 1979 when the Carter administration decided to derecognize the ROC and established foreign relation with the People¡¦s Republic of China (PRC).
Regardless, a Taiwan Relation Act (TRA ) was promulgated in the same year, which stands as the watershed of American policy toward Taiwan. Before the TRA, Taiwan had long been treated as but one component of the American global strategic thinking to counter the PRC. Thereafter, the US has been more inclined to look at its separate relations with Taiwan detached from China although American considerations in these days have to be constrained by Chinese claim of Taiwan¡¦s territory in their mutual pursuit of accommodation.
One manifestation of the evolution of American policy toward Taiwan has been American contemplation of the legal status of Taiwan. Until 1950 the US had persistently taken the position that Taiwan was part of China. To justify its protection of Taiwan after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration declared that the legal status of Taiwan was uncertain and should be settled internationally. The policy lasted until 1972 when the US formally acknowledged in the Shanghai Communique that ¡§all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only but China and Taiwan is a part of China.¡¨ This so-called ¡§One China Policy¡¨ has been embodied in the ¡§Three Communiques¡¨ between the PRC and the US although the contents may have varied and been subject to different interpretations over the years with changing contexts.
The other manifestation has been American commitment to Taiwan¡¦s defense as stipulated in the TRA. Although the administrations since Carter have calculated to be vague over whether the US would send troops to defend Taiwan in case of war, peaceful resolutions between the Straits of Taiwan has so far been faithful followed, which was vividly demonstrated in the 1995-96 Missile Crises. Again, Clinton¡¦s ¡§Three Pillars¡¨ in 1999 had impressively reiterated American expectation that China should not resort to forces in dealing with Taiwan.
Since ¡§One China Policy¡¨ does not necessarily negate the possibility of recognizing a Republic of Taiwan, which will be elaborated later, this purposeful ambiguity has left an ample space for proponents of the Taiwan Independence Movement in their pursuit of establishing an independent Republic of Taiwan. However, after the visit to China by Clinton and his explicit spell of the so-called ¡§Three No¡¦s¡¨ in 1998 , the people of Taiwanese began to wonder whether American policy toward Taiwan was undergoing some changes of course. Nonetheless, President George W. Bush¡¦s recent remark to Taiwan in April as ¡§Republic of Taiwan¡¨ and later the White House¡¦s refusal to make any correction also prompt the Taiwanese to believe that the spontaneous gesture may not have come completely by accident.
I shall start with a recapitulation of past American policy toward Taiwan since the Truman administration. Secondly, a Realist-Structural perspective, which argues that systemic factors have in great part dominated in this context, is laid out as the conceptual framework of investigation. Thirdly, we will provide seven scenarios for arraying future relationships between the US and Taiwan in the context of a triangular configuration among the US, Taiwan, and China in East Asia. Finally, a Constructivist perspective, which makes a plea for due attention to the zeal of the Taiwanese people besides power politics, is rendered as a potential guidance for the future relations between the US and Taiwan.
Evolving American Policy toward Taiwan
Historical Background: Before Taiwan was occupied Japan in 1985, some American businessmen had reckoned the annexation of Taiwan. Commodore Perry also made the same recommendation to the American government, pointing out the island¡¦s strategic value. During World War II, when Taiwan was still ruled by Japan, three options were once considered for the future of Taiwan: allowing for its independence, returning it to China, or introducing an allied trusteeship. In the end, it was resolved both by Roosevelt and later by Truman to return the island to China, and the decision was later confirmed openly in the non-binding Cairo Declaration of 1943 and in the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945. It was therefore not surprising that the Truman administration did not take it seriously when the native Taiwanese sought help from the US in their 1947 revolt (February 28 Incident) against the ruling Nationalist Chinese (KMT), who took over the island from Japan after the war.
The Truman Administration (1945-53) ¢w Defending Taiwan with Reluctance: After failing to mediate the struggle between the KMT and the Communist Chinese (CCP), Truman was determined to avoid further involvement in the Chinese civil war. It was thus decided to abandon Chiang Kai-shek¡¦s China.
Before the KMT was defeated by the CCP in 1949, Gen. Wedmeyer raised again the idea of a UN trusteeship or a US guardianship for Taiwan, which was again never taken seriously. When the KMT took refugee in Taiwan in 1949, it was generally expected that it soon would be taken over by the CCP. Truman declared in January 1950 that Taiwan was a part of China and that the US would not provide military assistance to the Nationalist troops on Taiwan. The suggestion to hold a UN plebiscite was also rejected by the Department of State subsequently.
Still, not everyone in the Truman administration agreed with him to abandon Taiwan. Kennan, for instance, being equally unsympathetic to the KMT, he was opposed to giving up Taiwan and preferred to leave it to Japan and indirectly to the US although he did recognize the existence of hostility between the PRC and the USSR. The perception of Deteriorating American credibility must have contributed to Truman¡¦s reassessment of Taiwan policy in 1950.
Domestic politics played a catalytic role in the Truman administration¡¦s reversal of his policy to give up Taiwan. In the 1948 election year, Truman was harshly under attack by the Republicans, who charged that Roosevelt had sold out East Europe and Truman had sold out China. Being afraid that the Congress would vote against his European Security plan, Truman was obliged to keep on providing the KMT economic and military aids. Two weeks after his being elected, he abruptly turned down Chiang's request for more aid. But until June 1950, Truman still had to make a stand against strong pressure from the Republican to provide defense commitment to Taiwan. Domestic politics must have made him prudent in his withdrawing support from the KMT.
Yet the most important factor that had changed Truman¡¦s mind was the Korean War. Three days after the war, the Seventh Fleet was dispatched to protect Taiwan. Truman reversed his earlier position and announced that the status of Taiwan was uncertain. What changed his mind? Gaddis argued that it was the concern over possible Soviet bases on Taiwan controlled by the PRC. George and Smoke provided a better explanation: protecting South Korea without protecting Taiwan was ¡§inconceivable,¡¨ especially facing strong domestic critics of Truman¡¦s China policy.
The Eisenhower Administration (1953-61) ¢w Military Alliance through the Mutual Defense Treaty: As is well known, Eisenhower and Dulles' strategy was to surround the USSR and China with allies as instrument of deterrence around the world. The SEATO, the CENTO, and the bilateral defense treaties with South Korea and Taiwan were thus signed. Eisenhower disagreed with Truman¡¦s China policy , but he felt no necessity to attack China as other Republicans did.
A Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC was signed in 1954. And a Formosa Resolution was passed the next year authorizing the president to employ armed forces to defend Taiwan. Missiles that could carry nuclear warheads were provided to Taiwan in 1957. In the 1958 Second Quemoy Crises, Eisenhower was not hesitant to show his determination to use nuclear weapons if necessary. The relationship between the two countries thus reached another peak.
Even though the PRC once demonstrated its willing to communicate with the US in the 1955 Bandung conference by implying that it would not use forces to liberate Taiwan, Eisenhower seemed untouched. Dulles restated firm American support for the KMT in 1957 and objected to recognition of the PRC. Why did he so unconditionally support Taiwan? Gaddis observed that it was not due to his ideological rigidity but his efforts to ¡§split two communists by exhausting the junior partner, forcing it to make demands its senior ally could not meet.¡¨
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (1961-63, 1963-69) ¢w Closer Relations in Global Transformation: Since the end of World War II, the US had at times considered playing upon China as a counterweight against the USSR; but the Korean War destroyed Truman¡¦s hope of rapprochement with China. The relationship between China and the Soviet Union, as communist partners, began to deteriorate in the 1950s, and military conflict was seen in 1969 over border dispute, which led to rapprochement between China and the US.
The Eisenhower administration had managed to contact China since 1955 and held ambassador-level talks in Geneva and later in Warsaw, with limited success. Although the Kennedy administration was less hostile to China, he was, as Gaddis observes, more pragmatic and against the tendency to look at any turmoil as inspired by communists. Once inaugurated in 1960, he began to notice ideological conflict between China and the USSR and attempted to improve relationship with China but received cool response. Further, his efforts at embarking on new China policy failed as Congress and public criticism resisted. Therefore, while he may not have been sympathetic to the KMT, he equally did not want to risk domestic political stability in attempting to recognize China. As the Vietnam War postponed the possibility of any compromise with China once again as did the Korean War, the relations between the US and Taiwan were ever drawn closer than before.
The Nixon and Ford Administrations (1969-74, 1974-77) ¢w Neglecting Taiwan in Approaching China: The overture to court China was actively sought by the Nixon administration. The first motivation was an effort to resolve the Vietnam War by requiring China to take the place of the US. The second factor was change of American global strategy from fighting a two-and-half war to a one-and-half war. Once it was recognized that China was a crucial element in the global game of balance-of-power that was advantageous to the US, it was decided that China should not be defeated. Rapprochement was inevitable regardless whoever was in office.
It was exactly during the administration of Nixon, whom the KMT deemed as a staunch anticommunist and who once hold Truman for the responsibility of losing China, that the relationship between the US and Taiwan was descending. For instance, Congress repealed the Formosa Resolution in 1974; one of the two squadrons of F-4 jet fighters was removed in 1974. When Saigon fell in 1975, Ford declared that his aim was to ¡§reaffirm our commitment to Taiwan.¡¨ One month later, nevertheless, the other F-4 squadrons were removed.
In recollection, during the Nixon and Ford administrations, the US was essentially inclined to espouse a ¡§Two Chinas Policy.¡¨ The final crush had yet to come from the Cater administration.
The Carter Administration (1977-81) ¢w Derecognizing Taiwan: Carter¡¦s acceleration of recognition of China, according to Brzezinski, was due to his disappointment in detente. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seemed to further convince him the primacy of normalization with China.
The US announced its decision to derecognize Taiwan on 15 December 1978. When asked by reporters why the American Ambassador woke up Chiang Ching-kuo at the midnight, Brzezinski seemed astonished to reply: ¡§I would say they were given probably more than six years notice. After all President Nixon...in the Shanghai Communique, foreshadowed this.¡¨ The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 was terminated the next year. Two months later, having gained tacit agreement from the US, China waged its war of punishment against Vietnam. The US also seemed satisfied that China was able to tie down 50 Soviet divisions of troops.
The Reagan and Bush Administrations (1981-89, 1989-93) ¢w Disenchantment in Euphoria: When Republican Reagan, who blamed Carter mercilessly for abandoning the ROC and pledged to upgrade American relations with Taiwan, was elected, the KMT celebrated that their man had at long last come to power. Although Reagan had personal attachment to and shared the same ideological predisposition with the KMT, he failed to fulfill his promises. Preoccupied with further improvement of American relations with China, Reagan signed a Second Shanghai Communique (817 Communique) in 1982 pledging to reduce arms sales to Taiwan gradually while rejecting Taiwan¡¦s request to purchase 150 FX¡¦s.
With a career in the Foreign Service, Bush had his personal attachment to China although he also shared a strong feeling toward Taiwan. Being eager for further accommodation with the PRC, he hurried to China as soon as elected. Although the so-called ¡§Taiwan Card¡¨ was raised when Tiananmen Incident took place, Taiwan was basically seen as a barrier to American ¡§constructive engagement¡¨ with China. Especially in the wake the shatter of the Soviet Empire, the US, pursuing the newly designed and yet seemingly faint ¡§New World Order,¡¨ had to deal with China face to face rather than from the old triangle perspective.
Nonetheless, encountering mounting pressure from business interests in 1992 reelection, Bush had no choice but to give consent to the sale of 150 F16¡¦s to Taiwan and sent American Trade Representative Clara Hills to visit Taiwan, the first such an official visit since 1979. Since this sale contradicted what was specified in the 817 Communique, it appeared that the TRA took precedence of the 817 Communique, a disposition the US had endeavored to avoided disclosure. To sum up, Reagan and Bush took a more balanced handling between China and Taiwan.
The Clinton Administration (1993-2001) ¢w Three No¡¦s out of Ambiguity: To the dismay of the KMT, Democrat Clinton, although having attacking Bush for his appeasement of the Butcher in Peking during presidential campaigns, tended to give emphasis to China at the expense of Taiwan. Seeking a constructive strategic partnership with China in the short term, Clinton¡¦s strategy of ¡§Comprehensive Engagement¡¨ in the post-Cold War era had essentially followed his former administrations¡¦ footsteps, while his policy toward Taiwan, judging from his 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, by and large remained the same. Basically a domestic president, Clinton¡¦s foreign policy had been characterized as lacking any grand strategy.
It is understandable that Clinton was unwilling to upgrade American relations with Taiwan for fear of offending China. However, facing pressure from Congress, Clinton was forced to agree with Lee Teng-hui¡¦s visit at Cornell University. It must be pointed out that it was also Clinton who sent Nimitz and Independence to deter China during the 1996 Missile Crises, testifying again that the security of Taiwan as guaranteed in the TRA outweighs other policy considerations. In this sense, Clinton was legitimate to say that his policy toward Taiwan has steered the same course.
Still, Clinton had added some ingredients into the cross-strait relations. While former presidents would prefer the status quo and refrain from becoming a self-acclaimed mediator between China and Taiwan, Clinton seemed content to encourage, if not to drive, Taiwan to resume dialogue with China. Further, his interpretation of the ¡§One China Policy¡¨ also broke the intended ambiguity veiled in the three Communiques with China. While Clinton¡¦s predecessors would acknowledge the Chinese position ¡§that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China,¡¨ the blunt, if not reckless, Clinton administration was more ready to recognize it.
The final devastating punch come from the ¡§Three No¡¦s¡¨ during Clinton¡¦s visit in China in 1998. At noted by the Clinton administration, the ¡§Three No¡¦s¡¨ seem to have been deposited in the Three Communiques with China. However, the strongest phrases ever used is ¡§has no intention of ¡K pursuing a policy of ¡¥two Chinas¡¦ or ¡¥One China,¡¦¡¨ rather than the explicit expression ¡§does not support¡¨ an independent Taiwan. If the selection of Clinton¡¦s expressions had been purposeful, Taiwan would have to discern what message Clinton is conveying.
Probably with a eye to counterbalance the perception that American policy in East Asia in the 1990s had been lopsided in favor of China and at the cost of Taiwan, Clinton proclaimed his unprecedented ¡§Three Pillars¡¨ in dealing with China and Taiwan at a press conference: one China, dialogues, and peaceful resolution. In the past, the US would adopt his own vague ¡§One China Policy¡¨ in reaction to the orthodox ¡§One China Principle¡¨ imposed by China. One the other hand, American commitment to the security of Taiwan has been firmly enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act. For the Americans, their relationship with Taiwan and those with China should be contemplated bilaterally rather than multilaterally. However, if forced to choose between Taiwan¡¦s security and relationships with China, it seems that the unilateral entrustment to the TRA has outweighed the three Communiques with China. Peace in the Straits of Taiwan and dialogue between Taiwan and China constitute the only two linkages envisage by the US.
A Structural Realist Perspective
I shall posit that American foreign policy since 1945 has been determined by its calculation of national interests, defined mainly in terms of national security. The consideration of national interests, however, is constrained by the international system. When the structure of the system changes, the US has to adjust its foreign policy to meet the new structural constraints in order to maintain its interests.
This structural perspective is not operating in isolation. Other factors, such as ideology, domestic politics, bureaucracy competition, and so on, may go hand in hand with systemic factors and may slightly adjust the policy derived from systemic consideration. But it is systemic factors that dominate American foreign policy making, particularly in the case of its Taiwan policy. When ideology and national interests, for instance, are congruent, they reinforce each other in the rationalization of certain policy outputs, usually favorable to Taiwan. On the other hand, when the commitment to ideology conflicts with national interests, the latter is usually the final arbitrator, which generally will generate unfavorable policy toward Taiwan. In this case, the relationship between ideology and foreign policy seems spurious. And if we control for systemic factors, we may find that there is slight relationship left between ideology and foreign policy at all. In this way, it is not too much to state that the most crucial explanatory variable is national interests, which are constrained by the structure of the system.
In the period of 1945-91, the global triangle was composed of the US, the USSR, and China, while the regional one in East Asia is made of the US, China, and the Taiwan. We may view the Taiwan-US relationship as but a link of the China-US-Taiwan triangle, which is in turns dependent on the global USSR-US-China triangle. When the structure of the global triangle varies, the three actors in the former triangle have to adjust among themselves.
The global triangle had evolved from a balanced triangle or a quasi-bipolar (US vs. USSR+China) in the 1960s (T1), to an unstable and loose triangle in the 1970s (T2), and finally to another balanced triangle or an embryo bipolar matrix (US+China vs. USSR) in the 1980s (T3). The regional China-US-Taiwan triangle had subsequently evolved from a stable one in the 1960s (t1) and, to a less degree in the 1970s (t2), to an unstable one in the 1980s (t3). Even with the breakup of the USSR in 1991 and the US left as the lonely superpower (T4), the regional triangle in East Asia has largely remained the same (t4) (Figure 2).
The Taiwan-US relationship, evolving from tight military allies to loose partners, has basically a function of fundamental structural changes of the international system. Although the asymmetric relationship between the US and Taiwan has stayed relatively the same since 1950, the stability is slightly fluctuating.
Seven Scenarios in the Future
Logically, the triangular relationship may have eight possible configurations (Figure 3). We may classify them into four modes: menage a trios, romantic triangle, stable marriage, and mutual exclusion (figure 4). According to cognition theory, while menage a trios and stable marriage are stable relationships, romantic triangle and mutual exclusion are unstable ones (Heider, 1946).
Starting with the current unstable regional triangle (t4 in Figure 2, or S0 in Figure 5), we may come up with seven possible scenarios for the US-China-Taiwan relationships: S1, S2, and S3 are first-order derivations, S4, S5, and S6 are second-order ones, and S7 is a third-order one. It is noted that while the three second-order modes are unstable, the other four modes are stable. It is assumed that high-level derivation is less tenable since more efforts are needed in order to transform the configurations sequentially.
If the positive Taiwan-US relationship is to be maintained, in order to maintain a balanced regional triangle, there are two possibilities: either the PRC-Taiwan link is transformed into friendly one (S1), or the PRC-US link has to shift back to inimical one as in the 1960s and 1970s (S2). Judging from the recent development of growing strategic need and economic ties between the US and the PRC, their relationship can only grow closer and hence the latter possibility seems less probable. This leaves the former option, that is, a harmonious PRC-Taiwan relationship, more tenable.
On the other hand, is it conceivable that the Taiwan-US relationship should turn sour or negative in the context of a balanced regional triangle? One can imagine the possibility that the US should decide to embrace the PRC in all respects and to turn its back on Taiwan (S3). To attain regional balance under this configuration, the US has to sacrifice its economic tie with Taiwan and scratch its moral commitment underwritten in the Taiwan Relation Act.
S4 may develop from S1 or S3. First of all, for some unknown reasons, the amicable US-Taiwan relationships embedded in the peaceful regional triangle turn sour while China keep equal cordial relations with both the US and Taiwan. In this sense, a seemingly tranquil triangle East Asia may be transient; if the peacemaking between China and Taiwan is not endorsed by the US, this settlement may turn out costly for Taiwan since the US would back away from its security commitment.
Secondly, Taiwan may decide to embrace China after desperately perceived isolated by both China and the US, which means China comes to Taiwan¡¦s rescue in the latter¡¦s diplomatic isolation. In some sense, the transformations represent Taiwan¡¦s determination to switch its friendship from the US to China. It will take place only when the Taiwanese feel obliged to integrate with China because of economic, political, or cultural affinities. One can imagine when the above conditions will be made: economic prosperity, political democracy, or cultural identity. At this point, it all depends the Taiwanese what is their thought to have their own body political Taiwan.
S5 may arrive from S1 or S2. For one thing, the seemingly untroubled regional triangle may grow unstable because of the rift between the US and China somehow deteriorates and turns into full-scale conflicts. This is highly probable given the undisguised competition between the two giants in all spheres after the breakup of the Soviet Union. At this juncture, Taiwan has to strike a delicate balance between the US, a longtime allay, and China, a hegemonic neighbor.
Alternatively, Taiwan may seek to improve its relationships with China after Taiwan¡¦s alliance with the US is firmly secured. This contour may take place when an isolated China seeks to break the impasse by making peace with Taiwan. At this juncture, it is imperative that Taiwan should obtain understanding fro the fraternal US; otherwise, a neglectful US may feel unwilling to render its support in case a ready China makes up its mind to absorb Taiwan.
S6 may follow from S2 or S3. In the beginning, Taiwan may take steps to secede its cooperation with the US even when China, Taiwan¡¦s foe, collides with the US. This is an unwise calculation for Taiwan by giving up its only patron in this region. On the other hand, the development may be conceived an improvement from total isolation by both the US and China. At least, Taiwan does not have to fight a two-front war with collaborated China and the US. In other word, the relinquishment of the relationships with the US can only be barely compensated by an equally disruption of those between the US and China.
The least plausible scenario is the one that the PRC-Taiwan link somehow turns amicable, such as a forced unification, and the PRC-US link turns hostile (S7). This configuration is less probable in two counts: firstly, the development is not called for by the US unless it finally comes to conflict with the PRC; and secondly, a rift between the US and Taiwan is against American national interest given the enormous economic stakes on the island.
In our assessments, Taiwan¡¦s preference would be:
S1¡ÖS2¡ÖS5¡ÖS0¡ÖS4¡ÖS6¡ÖS3¡ÖS7.
From the standing point from Taiwan, whether peace (S1), alliance with the US (S2), or even equal distance with the US and China (S5) is an improvement of the status quo (S0). Since peace (S1) and alliance (S2) are stable configurations, they would yield more utility than does equidistance (S5); furthermore, equidistance (S5) would suggest degrade relationships with the US and thus is deemed less acceptable than peace (S1) and alliance (S2). Moreover, any frames whence Taiwan would dispute with the US (S4, S6, S3, and S7) are considered deviated from the statues quo (S0). While Taiwan¡¦s absorption by China is totally undesirable, hostile US-China relations (S6) are better than amiable ones (S3) when Taiwan attempts to confront both the US and China. Finally, when Taiwan stands opposed to the US, a China detente with both the US and Taiwan (S4) is preferable to one hostile to the rest (S6) since the former is only one step to peace (S1) and the later is one step to absorption (S7).
The preference for the US would take the following :
S1¡ÖS0¡ÖS2¡ÖS5¡ÖS3¡ÖS4¡ÖS6¡ÖS7.
We assume that peace is the best scenario (S1) and the absorption of Taiwan by China (S7) is the worst one in the eyes of the US. It is arguable whether the status quo (S0) is much desirable than an alliance with Taiwan against China (S2). During the Clinton administration, the order seemed to have been S0¡ÖS2, judging from the priority given to comprehensive. Nonetheless, the predisposition may be reversed (S2¡ÖS0) if a hegemonic China is prepared to challenge the US during the Bush administration. Given the conditions that China has set out to confront the US and that the US is determined to retain affectionate relationships with Taiwan, it is not obvious whether it is preferable for the US that Taiwan would seek cooperative relationship with China or not. We may probe the ranking from two perspectives. Firstly, the triangle where an alliance with Taiwan is formed (S2) is more stable than one where Taiwan would keep equal distance with both the US and China (S5). Secondly, Taiwan¡¦s equidistance is less desirable in American viewpoint since Taiwan would take a more active role in the triangular interactions. Any scenarios in short of Taiwan¡¦s intimate association with the US (S3, S4, and S6) are deemed acceptable given American crucial stakes in Taiwan. If it turns out that the US has to forge cooperative relationships with China at the expense of Taiwan, it is preferable for the US that Taiwan stays aloof from China (S3¡ÖS4) because it would not allow China to take a more dominant role in the three-way maneuver. While intrinsically unstable, an all-against-all regional configuration is less desirable for the US than one where China manages to take an equidistance stance towards both the US and Taiwan given the fact that the US can still count on China to deal with Taiwan.
From the above analyses, we may come up with some commonalities between the US and Taiwan in the triangular relationships among the US, Taiwan, and China. First of all, the US and Taiwan share the first choice of peace in East Asia (S1), and distaste the possibility of Taiwan being absorbed by China (S7). Secondly, they both would consider any chilly relations between them undesirable even though they differ in the preference over these possible scenarios (S3, S4, and S6). The major differences would be found in their disparate interpretations of whether the status quo is preferable. In Taiwan¡¦s view, any improvement of the current semi-official relationships with the US is welcome, whether alliance with the US (S2) or equidistance with both the US and China (S5). As we have noticed earlier, if China makes up its mind to counter the US, an alliance with Taiwan would eventually take precedence over the status quo (S2¡ÖS0).
Conclusions
Rationally speaking, one China carries a host of connotations along the spectrum from One China¡×PRC (Taiwan incorporated), One China¡×Two Governments (CCP & KMT), One China¡×ROC, One China¡×Historical, Cultural, Geographical China, and One China¡ÏOne Taiwan. Still, it must be pointed out that the TRA has nothing like ¡§Taiwan is a part of China.¡¨ Since not all interpretations are contradictory, the US has long chosen to keep all options open to be decided by Taiwan and China themselves.¡¨ This is the part of American policy toward Taiwan that seems to have been subject to periodic minor modifications but fundamentally has stayed intact since 1979.
What remains to be seen is whether or not the US would protect, if not send troops to Taiwan in case China invades the island after Taiwan formally declares independence. The US has designated in the TRA that the security issue of Taiwan is beyond any challenge although there has no formal relations between the US and Taiwan since 1979. Repeatedly, the TRA has been unconditionally invoked to demonstrate American commitment to defend Taiwan, suggesting its primacy over the 817 Communique. This entrustment is further reinforced after the revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guideline was promulgated in 1997. In retrospection, the relationships between the US and Taiwan in the past two decades had been amount to a quasi-alliance in short of the status of free association. The answer to the above question is thus definitely positive.
Based on the Structural Realist perspective of Kenneth Waltz (1979), we have shown that the dyadic US-Taiwan interaction may be treated as one link of the regional US-China-Taiwan triangle in East Asia, which in turns until the later 1990s been dependent on the configuration of the global US-USSR-China triangle. When the structure of the global system changed, manifested in terms of the realignment of the three Powers, the parts had to adjust themselves in order to preserve their own interests. These adjustments in turns led to structural changes in the regional sub-system whence the units in the sub-system again needed to rearrange their positions. These dynamics largely explain the US policy toward Taiwan over the 50 years.
When the CCP came to power in 1949, a new configuration of power emerged. The Truman administration initially decided to abandon Taiwan, but the outbreak of the Korean War made Truman reverse his Taiwan policy and the Seventh Fleet began to patrol the Strait of Taiwan. This policy lasted for about two decades; so did the global and the regional triangles.
The structure of the global triangle underwent a spectacular change in the late 1960s when the feud between the two communist partners turned into war. The development offered a favorable opportunity for the rapprochement between the US and China. After the US-China normalization in 1979, the global structural change entailed the restructuring within the regional triangle. With the demise of the Soviet Empire, the importance of China as an American counterweight against the USSR has disappeared. At the regional level, this means the US will be less willing to compromise on the Taiwan issue.
In our view, partisan politics, which is usually mixed with ideological position, with conservative Republican Congressmen playing vital roles in defending the KMT against the administration. However, their influence usually failed to change the policy already adopted by the executive branch. At best, they may have made the President more prudent when adopting policy that may have harmful to Taiwan. It is global strategic consideration that has largely decided the US policy toward Taiwan.
What has been left out is the determination of the Taiwanese to seek an independent Republic of Taiwan. As a distinct people with its own history and national identity, the Taiwanese people have never been offered the opportunity to exercise their right of national self-determination. As a setter¡¦s state, the US share with Taiwan¡¦s passion to breakaway from the chains imposed it by the former land of origin since the norm of self-determination is the highest form of human rights. The Taiwanese have the same right to decide their destiny as the Americans did according to the principle of people¡¦s sovereignty. As the nation-state is still the standard bearer of people even in the post-Cold War ear, Taiwan, in its legitimate quest for a de jure independent statehood, deserve its fair share in the international arena and ought not to be deemed as a reckless troublemaker. And the future status of Taiwan should not be confined by or linked to the terms or framework dictated by others, especially China. With this in mind, any effort to mediate between Taiwan and China as two separate sovereign states that may eventually lead to peaceful resolution, not unification, across the Taiwan Strait is welcome.
Nevertheless, the people of Taiwan need to reach a consensus on Taiwan¡¦s future even though they may retain dissimilar, but not necessarily contradictory, outlook of national identity. The ruling elite, not the US, is to be blamed for Taiwan¡¦s isolation because of their partisan manipulations of this issue. After all, the US has not categorically said that it is opposed to an independent Republic of Taiwan. As implicitly hidden in the TRA, the law is applicable to ¡§the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities.¡¨ Also the value-loaded terms ¡§people of Taiwan¡¨ rather than the more neutral term ¡§population of Taiwan¡¦ is invariably employed in the TRA and other documents, suggesting the prospect of any independent Taiwan if the Taiwanese should choose to exercise their right of self-determination.
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