Taiwan's Democracy: Challenges and Prospect

Cheng-Feng Shih

Associate Professor, Tamkang University

2001/8/23

Introduction

      Having been subject to alien rulers for the past 400 years, the Taiwanese, at the long last, have rejoiced in exercising their newly gained political democracy since the 1990s. In retrospection, it was actually the tacit agreement among the political elites that the process of democratization would be pursued in a nonviolent fashion , although the military should be acclaimed for its neutrality. Once the opposition had decided to undertake political reforms from within the system, the main arena for power transition had been national elections. The elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were normalized sequentially in 1991 and 1992. It was the native Lee Teng-hui¡]§õµn½÷¡^of the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party¤¤°ê°ê¥ÁÄÒ) who became the first directly elected President in 1996, although the dissent native Chen Shui-bian¡]³¯¤ô«ó¡^of the current ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP¥Á¥D¶i¨BÄÒ) did win the second presidential election in 2000 largely as a result of the internal feud and split of the KMT.

      Taiwan, as former colony of Japan, was handed over to the Republic of China (ROC¤¤µØ¥Á°ê) after World War II. Having been defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP¤¤°ê¦@²£ÄÒ) in the civil war, the KMT under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek¡]½±¤¶¥Û¡^took refuge in Taiwan in 1949, and had ever since maintained one of the longest bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the world on this island. Being shored up by military measures, it was further reinforced by three pillars: warding off military invasion from the People's Republic of China (PRC), providing material incentives from economic development, and encouraging patriotism to the state as the sole legitimate successor of the millennial lineage of Chinese dynasties . Penetrating from the fortified power center in Taipei to the peripheries, the KMT had maintained both horizontal and vertical divisions of labor: while the Mainlander Chinese would occupy the state apparatus, the native Taiwanese would have no choice but to stay in the private sector; while the former would monopolize political power in the central government, the latter would be indirectly controlled through divide-and-rule among combative local factions purposefully patronized by the KMT.

      As the specter to "Recover the Mainland"¡]¤Ï§ð¤j³°¡^began to fade away, the late Chiang Ching-kuo¡]½±¸g°ê¡^, son of Chiang Kai-shek, had no choice but to seek ways for accommodating his own followers among the hostile natives, to allow for the establishment of the first opposition party DPP in 1986, and to lift the martial law in 1987. In his later days, he once ventured to express that he might have been qualified as a Taiwanese after residing in Taiwan for such a long period. Before his decease, Chiang personally picked and chose Lee Teng-hui as his successor in the hope to countervail native antipathy in time. What broke the four-decade of the KMT party-state impasse was the unexpected succession to the presidency by Lee after Chiang Chin-kuo's sudden demise in 1988. To avoid breakdown in the global third wave of democratization, Lee embarked on political liberalization and democratization in a piecemeal fashion, whence the authoritarian regime began to crumble. While busy consolidating his power by disarming the conservatives within his own party, Lee sought to naturalize the regime incrementally by collaborating with the then opposition DPP in a series of constitutional amendments. Also, by promoting native elites to the ruling echelon, Lee turned the KMT into a lateral seceding party and won it an unofficial prefix as the Taiwan-KMT, meaning Taiwanese Nationalist Party¡]¥xÆW°ê¥ÁÄÒ¡^. In the end, Lee seemed to take pride in that the Republic of China had turned from the Republic of China on Taiwan¡]¤¤µØ¥Á°ê¦b¥xÆW¡^into a "Taiwanese Republic of China"¡]¥xÆW¤¤µØ¥Á°ê¡^.

      In this paper, we argue that democratization in Taiwan is best comprehended within a conceptual framework that seeks to account for the development of Taiwanese nationalism . In other words, democratization is but one facet of the Taiwanese efforts to establish their own nation-state. For the Taiwanese nationalists, they are equally entitled to the right of possessing a nation-state of their own as other nations are. Nurtured by the idea of self-determination and further inspired by the success of Irish and Korean independent movements after World War I, an embryo Taiwanese nationalism emerged to assert that "Taiwan is Taiwanese' Taiwan." It is thus sincerely envisioned that the formation of an independent Republic of Taiwan would be the raison d'etre of Taiwanese nationalism. In a minimal sense, Taiwanese nationalism is to disentangle the bondages imposed by the KMT, and to resist possible Chinese forceful incorporation of Taiwan. From a more positive perspective, the supreme goal of Taiwanese nationalism is to construct a modern nation-state .

      Samuel P. Huntington (1971) collapses the ventures to found a nation-state into two models: the post-colonial and the setters' states. In the former model, the struggle is between the natives and the colonial conquerors; and in the later one, the contention is among the indigenous peoples, the immigrants, and the home country. In the case of Taiwan, as a post-colonial settlers' society, the nationalist task is the combination of the above two: while the Han settlers have to seek reconciliation with the indigenous peoples, they have yet to fence off the menace of forceful incorporation by their home country (Ming Dynasty, Ching Dynasty, and ROC) and to resist a wave of alien regimes (Dutch, Spanish, Manchurian, and Chinese ones). In so interpreting, if the Han settlers are considered, and consider themselves as, natives of Taiwan, the quintessence of Taiwanese nationalism is to transform a traditional Chinese settler society into a modern multicultural nation-state.

      Alternatively, the approach to create a nation-state is generally classified into two prototypes: from nation to state, and from state to nation (Kohn, 1944; Alter, 1989; Nieguth, 1999). To follow the former path, nationalism is one integrating force to mobilize co-nationals to making a state of their own, in the hope that the political boundary would correspond to the national one. To pursue the latter track, the state machinery is enlisted to mold the nation as designed by nationalists. In earlier days, the Taiwanese nationalist passion was centered on the former in the rhetoric of expelling the alien KMT regime and/or the Mainlanders. In the past decade, the zeal has, to a certain degree strategically, been shifted to the latter approach in a more inclusive fashion. It appears that the Taiwanese nationalist discourse has gradually been refined from the quest for formal independence to the pursuit of a modern nation-state. In other words, except for the initial mission of state-making ¡]°ê®aªº»F«Ø¡^, the endeavor has been further decomposed into both goals of nation-building¡]¥Á±Úªº¶ì³y¡^and state-building ¡]°ê®aªº¥´³y¡^, the task of which is further subdivided into social reform, cultural reformation, ethnic integration, and economic autonomy, in addition to democratic consolidation.

      From democratic transition to democratic consolidation, Taiwan has yet to decide how to tackle three momentous challenges: to withstand the threat from China, militarily and culturally, in making and preserving a sovereign independent state; to manage ethnic cleavages in molding a multicultural political nation; and to construct political institutions that are conducive to representative democracy. The next three sections are devoted to the disentanglement of these three intertwined obstacles.

Chinese Threat and State-making

      As an island state caught in the middle of the intricate relationships between the US, and China , Taiwan's survival is constrained by the structural conditions delineated by its neighboring giants. It is not exaggerated to say that Taiwan's democracy is fundamentally predicated on how it has skillfully dealt with China. Specifically, the supreme goal of Taiwan's foreign affairs after the war has been to ally itself with the US in its defense against outright forceful incorporation by China .

      Internally, while the successive governments of the ROC relocated in Taiwan have effectively maintained solid ruling, the process of democratization starting in the 1990s has also, to a large degree, helped them to obtain legitimacy. Nonetheless, externally, the state has yet failed to score the recognition of the majority of the states in the international community owing to the avowed menace from the PRC, which has until recently claimed that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China .

      A Taiwanese nationalist would insist that democracy in Taiwan is impossible without sovereign independence. However, even though Taiwan may be no less qualified as a state than most member states in the United Nations since there are the population, the land, and even a government, these necessary conditions are not sufficient enough to make it a sovereign one yet . To borrow the terms of Hashimi (1997: 2), while Taiwan may possess substantive sovereignty, its procedural sovereignty is shaky, especial in terms of the membership to the UN, which is generally perceived as the birth certificate of being a state and the very symbol of dignity for the Taiwanese.

      Since the end of the war, the ruling KMT had incrementally assured Taiwan's separation with China by territorializing the ROC and by antagonizing the PRC. Since its rapprochement with the United States in 1979 , Chinese attitudes toward Taiwan have been undergoing dramatic changes, from the threat of using force to liberate Taiwan, and to the appeal of using negotiations for peaceful reunification. Just as the US has intentionally been vague regarding whether or not to protect, if not to send troops to Taiwan, in case that China invades the island after Taiwan formally declares independence, China has similarly hesitated to promise that it would resolve its differences with Taiwan without resorting to arms . Nevertheless, from Chinese President Jiang Zemin's "Eight Points ¡]¦¿¤KÂI¡^" in 1995 to Vice Premier Qian Quchen's recent "Seven Measures ¡]¿ú¤C¶µ¡^," the Chinese message has been clear to the Taiwanese: under the precondition of "One China¡]¤@Ó¤¤°ê¡^," accept "One Country, Two Systems ¡]¤@°ê¨â¨î¡^" as such a special region as Hong Kong.

      In the beginning, given Taiwan's diplomatic isolation resulting from Chinese boycott, the relations with the PRC appeared to be the Achilles' heel of the Lee administration, which was increasingly under assault from the DDP, then in opposition, on its somewhat reluctant incompetence . To everyone's surprise, Lee introduced the "Two States Discourse"¡]¨â°ê½×¡^while interviewed by Voices of Germany in 1999 . Reiterating the KMT's established rejection to the "One Country, Two Systems" formula, Lee formally made known his interpretation of cross-strait relations as "a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship." By officially changing direction to "Two Chinas," Lee had deliberately ensured the separation of Taiwan and China, so that whoever succeeded him in the future would have little space deviating to the pro-unification orientation.

      For the present, political forces in all shades differ only slightly in their interpretations of the current international status of Taiwan. For the KMT, the New Party (NP·sÄÒ), and the newly organized People First Party (PFP¿Ë¥ÁÄÒ), the ROC has been a sovereign state since its establishment in 1911. Of course, Taiwanese nationalists would dispute that neither the ROC, which has ruled the island since 1945, nor Taiwan is a sovereign state in the conventional sense . For the ruling DDP, the majority of the elite opinion would be that Taiwan has declared its independence as¡@early as the first presidential election in 1996 .

      What struck us most are President Chen Shui-bian's seemingly reconciliatory attitudes toward China in his inauguration speech on May 20th, 2000, by appealing for the so-called "Five No's principle ¡]¤¤£¡^," that is, no declaring independence, no change of state title, no constitutional revision to institutionalize the "Two States Discourse" of former President Lee, no plebiscite for Taiwan's future, and no abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification. Furthermore, in his millennium speech on the New Year's Eve last year, President Chen pledged to undertake economic and cultural integrations with China, and to seek for a framework for perpetual peace and eventual political integration across the strait of Taiwan. The next day, he dauntlessly broke up the DPP taboo and brought up the idea of "One China under the Constitution of the Republic of China¡]¾Ëªk¤@¤¤¡^."

      In all appearance, the agenda of Chen Shui-bian's national security and China policy, at least for his first term as the president, is to stabilize cross-strait relations in short of Chinese absorption of Taiwan. With this priority on mind, anything lying between resuming official talks and negotiating a peace treaty with China would be considered a better sign of progress than the current deadlock. Even though China has up till now uncompromisingly insisted that Taiwan accept the so-called "One China" Principle, for the time being, measures have been taken to loosen regulations on direct trade with China.

Ethnic Cleavages and National-building

      To attain the goal of democratization in the context of nation-building, Taiwan has yet to face the knotted labyrinth of ethnic diversity. Owing to differences in race, language, and national identity, ethnic cleavages in Taiwan have so far manifested themselves in the form of clan feuds, electoral competitions, or even armed struggle, not only between the Han setters and the indigenous peoples but also among the Hans themselves (Shih, 1995). Nowadays, it is generally agreed that there are four major ethnic groups in Taiwan: Indigenous Peoples¡]ì¦í¥Á±Ú¡^, Mainlanders¡]¥~¬Ù¤H¡^, Hakkas¡]«È®a¤H¡^, and Holos¡]Åb¦Ñ¤H¡^. Ethnic competitions would be found mainly along three configurations: Indigenous Peoples vs. Hans (Mainlanders ¡ÏHakkas¡ÏHolos), Hakkas vs. Holos, and Mainlanders vs. Natives (Indigenous Peoples¡ÏHakkas¡ÏHolos). In the present day, the most serious ethnic disputes are prevalently found in the protracted power struggle between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. The thrust of nation-building is thus to crystallize the loose Taiwanese people (or people of Taiwan) into a Taiwanese nation.

      Ethnic identity and national identity in Taiwan are highly coterminous with each other . On the one hand, one's ethnic identity (native Taiwanese or Mainlander) would largely decide one's national identity (Taiwanese or Chinese) and hence one's attitudes toward the issue of Taiwan's future (independence or unification). On the other hand, one's ethnic identity is also composed of one's conception of national identity and/or Taiwan's relations with China in the future, especially for the Mainlander. As the KMT trinity of ideology-leader-state began to wither away under Lee's presidency, especially from 1995 on, the Mainlanders needed to define their ethnic identity, national identity, and party identification.

      Compared to the Chinese Ming Dynasty loyalist Koxinga¡]°ê©m·Ýor¾G¦¨¥\¡^and the Chiang father and son, Lee Teng-hui's ROC had given up its fictive claim over the territory of the whole China, and abandoned its contest with the PRC as the legitimate China. Ostensibly, the rhetoric had been "One China, two regions, and two equal political entities," which would actually read "one country, two governments." Still, Lee seemed resolute to nurture Taiwan as a cultural Chinese state, and to cultivate the Taiwanese as the better Chinese. In other words, while retaining the mythical Chinese cultural identity, Lee would also like to uphold the concrete Taiwanese political identity. In this regard, Lee is still by nature a Han, if not Chinese, loyalist. Since there is no easy way to reconcile cultural and political facets of national identity, the "official nationalism" of the KMT is mostly a Janus-faced form of born-again "reform nationalism ."

      To further withstand Chinese nationalism, Lee Teng-hui endeavored to construct a community of fate ¡]¥Í©R¦@¦PÅé¡^for the residents of Taiwan by resorting to the principle of people's sovereignty¡]¥DÅv¦b¥Á¡^in a communitarian fashion. In his cardinal contemplation, all policy priorities are given to the whole residents of Taiwan, which implicitly makes him a territorial Taiwanese nationalist since a nation is a community of fate embedded on its sovereign state. Curious enough, even thorough Lee has in general followed a "Independence Taiwan" ¡]¿W¥x¡^line in the past few years, he has so far refrained from the articulation of Taiwanese nationalism .

      Internally, in order to court the native voters to empathize with the stigmatized KMT in elections, Lee openly spelled out "the sorrow of Taiwanese" while interviewed by a Japanese writer (born in Taiwan before the war) in 1995 before the first popular presidential election, which unintentionally alienated the Mainlanders for his favorable pro-Japanese predispositions. Consequently, Lee had to come up with the concept of "New Taiwanese"¡]·s¥xÆW¤H¡^in the Taipei mayoral election in 1998. In accepting the new created inclusive identity, the Mainlanders seemed relieved to have been finally salvaged. While the long waited reconciliatory design is widely welcome, the newly coined term remains not only vague but ambiguous also .

      Even if this ingenious orthodox of ethnic integration may have alleviated ethnic tension at home, the controversial issue of national identity has not been resolved at rest as expected, again, particularly for the Mainlanders. While some Mainlander elites start out admitting themselves as Taiwanese, they still cling to their Chinese identity. In any case, most of them still consider themselves Chinese first and Taiwanese second, or rather rhetorically "Chinese on Taiwan ," much the same as the state is "ROC on Taiwan." Understandably, by so dubiously defining, Taiwanese is relegated to a territorial regional identity while Chinese is advanced to a national one.

      In spite of Lee's vigorous maneuver, however, "Two States Discourse" provides a host of connotations along the spectrum from "Two States in One China"¡]¤@¤¤¨â°ê¡^espoused by the loyalists, through literal "Two States in One Chinese Nation"¡]¤@Ó¥Á±Ú¡B¨âÓ°ê®aor¤@±Ú¨â°ê¡^by the KMT mainstream, and to "Two Chinese States"¡]¨âӵؤH°ê®a¡^by President Chen. Even among the KMT elites, there have been contestations over whether to employ the suffix "One Nation," or "One Chinese Nation" after "Two States," since nation would carries dissimilar as well as multiple interpretations both in Han-Chinese and in English. If "One Nation" stands for an amorphously cultural Chinese people¡]µØ¤H¡^, the formula is on even terms with the DPP since Singapore is also broadly "misperceived" in Taiwan as a Chinese state. However, if it is contemplated as a political Chinese nation¡]¤¤µØ¥Á±Ú¡^, the denomination strongly implies pro-unification predisposition, which is also understood in Taiwan as the so-called "German model" of unification . After the last presidential election, Lee admitted that the reason why the KMT had lost to the DPP was mainly due to internal cleavages over identity among the party members and supporters. Concurrently, Lee was forced to step down from his chairmanship from the KMT after angry protesters surrounded the party headquarter and demanded his resignation.

      Now that most of the ruling DPP elites seem plainly willing to illuminate Chinese nation as cultural one and disregard its political, historical, or geographic meanings, it is no wonder the native-born Chen would agree that both the ROC and the PRC are two Chinese states. By so doing, Chen and the DPP feel comfortable to take over the ROC state apparatus from Lee. It appears that President Chen is ready to consider himself as a Chinese (µØ¤H), probably having a mind to appease China, and to tranquilize the Mainlanders.

Political Institutions and State-building

      In order to achieve the quest for state-building, the Taiwanese are further burdened with the archaic systems transplanted from China after the war. For the Taiwanese, as strangers to the system, the road from voice, dissent, to loyalty, to borrow the terms from Hirschman (1990), is not tantamount to a wholehearted embracement of the MKT regime, which is at best a Second Republic of China; nor is it their declared campaign to dismantle the system outright. Still, without superseding them with ones constructed upon the consensus reached after thorough deliberations and bargains, the natives cannot help but engulf themselves in a colonial mentality of captive dependence.

      Right now, the working constitutional framework under the ROC is laid down by the six amendments made in the 1990s. Even though it is largely recognized by the elites that the crucial battlefield that would decide who is to govern is the presidential election, there is no consensus as to whether it is a presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential system. While the president is popularly elected, there is a premier who is appointed by the president but is said to be "accountable to" the Legislative Yuan. As the outgoing KMT enjoyed a bare majority in the fourth Parliament elected in 1998, it had persistent insisted that it possessed the mandate to form the cabinet even if its candidate Lien Chan¡]³s¾Ô¡^stood the third in the 2000 presidential election. For the two consecutive cabinets of the DPP government, the informal executive coalitions have been made between the DPP and Lee's followers still sojourning in the KMT.

      In order for the president to be accountable directly to the voters, he should be equipped with the legislative power in the form of legislative veto. In other words, if the president disapproves of any bill passed by the Legislative Yuan, he may overwrite it so long as, say, one-third of the legislators are behind him. Also, as long as there is a premier between the president and the cabinet members, it is not clear with whom the legislators should deal in the administrative triangle. As the premier is becoming the chief of staff of the president, premiership ought to be abolished or reduced to the functionary of the presidential office.

      Whatever the interpretations of the text of and amendments to the ROC constitution, it is generally shared that its ambiguous arrangements are the major causes of the political deadlock after President Chen's inauguration in 2000. It is time that major political players and future would-be presidential candidates come forward to express their desirable vision of the constitutional system to the public, specifically how to strike the balance between the executive and the parliament. Moreover, as the past constitutional amendments had been negotiated behind the scene with an eye to avoid unnecessary obstructions, it is difficulty to assess the responsibility for the current constitutional stalemate. We believe that it is imperative this time that a brand new constitutional be designed and subject to popular referendum.

      What has fueled this constitutional upheaval is the volatile party system undergoing realignment. In the past fifteen years, the party system in Taiwan has evolved from a party-state system where no democratic party was allowed, through an one-party dominant system where the ruling KMT was challenged by the opposition DPP, and into a competitive multiparty one where no party is able to score a solid majority of the votes in both legislative and presidential elections. Underlying this tripartite configuration are the single-nontransferable-vote (SNTV) electoral system for legislative elections and the simple plurality formula for the presidential election, both of which are conducive to internal rivalry. Further, the introduction of the proportional representation (PR) component to the hitherto SNTV mechanism has also created significant centrifugal dispositions.

      In the past, the electoral bases of these parties could be safely attributed to ethnic identity (native Taiwanese vs. Mainlanders), national identity (Taiwanese vs. Chinese), and attitudes towards the issue of independence and unification. Until the late 1990s, as these three axes of these cleavages had tended to converge, the political space of the major parties could be orderly arranged along a spectrum, ranging from the extreme end of pro-unification/Mainlanders, through the middle ground of the status quo/Mainlanders-native Taiwanese coalition, and to the edge of pro-independence/ native Taiwanese. As party politics gradually realigned along this identity axe, these reinforcing cleavages had by and large literally explained voters' party identification in Taiwan. While the NP would be considered as an extricating Mainlander party, formed in 1993 as a result of the PR electoral element by some anti-Lee conservatives who would consider themselves as "the" authentic KMT, and the KMT would have safely retained the central ground as a mechanism of ethnic consociation between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, the DPP had been largely perceived as "the" Taiwanese party, read the ethnic, if not nationalist, party for the native Taiwanese from its inception in 1986.

      Although resorting to ethnic mobilization in elections may be morally proscribed, at least in the public sphere, the elites have hitherto failed to search for any issue that may cut across ethnic cleavages. Reckoning on voters' dealignment and possible party realignment, most candidates have purposely minimized their own party affiliations as early as the third legislative election in 1995. Engulfed in the disarray of party identification, major political parties have been busy courting the imagined median voters by moving closer to the center in major issue areas and policy dimensions. Without a durable party base, it is difficult to sustain a stable party system. One possible political space worthy of traversing would be to disentangle the above mentions three identity dimensions.

      It is the 2000 presidential election that has disrupted the large-medium-small triangular system. Meanwhile, the splinter PFP, formed after the election, is becoming a new Zion for the Mainlanders; its party chairman James Soong¡]§º·¡·ì¡^, a third presidential candidate and a former KMT secretary-general, has made all efforts to make it a non-ethnic party by engaging in coalition formation with native politicians, which makes its location along the ethnic spectrum difficult. Finally, as the conservatives/Mainlanders within the KMT are reasserting their pro-unification stance in order to fence off Soong's snatch, some native adherents of Lee's line within the KMT have made up their minds to set up the Taiwan United Alliance¡]TUA¥xÆW¹Îµ²Áp·ù¡^and pledged to sit between the DPP and the KMT.

      If a two-party system is deemed more compatible to the presidential system, both the legislative and the presidential electoral system need to be adjusted. During a transitional period, absolute majority seems warranted for the presidential election, at least to ensure a two-camp party system. Furthermore, the electoral system of single-member-simple-plurality for the legislative election has proved to possess centripetal incentives. If the electoral system should switch to a mixed one with double ballots, as the Russian one, or to an additional member system, as the German one, it is expected that the best approximation we can obtain would still be a moderately fragmental one.

Conclusions

      To consolidate newly gained democracy, Taiwan need to secure an independent sovereign nation-state, to manage ethnic cleavages, and to engineer political institutions. This is a three-pronged approach to democratic consolidation: state-making, nation-building, and state-building.

      Although most Taiwanese leaders would claim that only the Taiwanese have the right to decide Taiwan's future relationships with China, their treatments of the issue of national identity have been recognizably inadequate. Fusing the shell of the ROC and the soul of Taiwan, they appear steadfastly determined to retain the status quo by tacitly proposing an expedient identity of hybridity. In due time, a simple acid test should be given: whether the Taiwanese have a mind to share one Chinese state with the Chinese across the strait of Taiwan.

      Just as the residents of Taiwan have so far failed to reach any consensus on their identities, so are they not certain whether these interwoven sentiments are ethnic, national, or partisan one. While politicians may find it convenient to play ethnic cards during elections, external threats from China may eventually force ethnic identity to give way to national identity in time of crises.

Without any slightly effort at constructing political institutions, the alternation of regimes is nothing but the transfer of political power from the Mainlanders to the natives. In a word, mechanic electoralism is not amount to democracy, and certainly cannot take the place of the heartfelt popular participation on the way to state-building.

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Paper presented at the Kim Dae-Jung Peace Foundation's International Conference on Democracy in East Asia and the Role of Korea. Seoul, Korea, December 5, 2001.

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